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CONFLICT, CRISIS AND CONFUSION
IN NEW YORK
BRA1NERD Culuu*

N RECENT YEARS the New York courts have been making
conspicuous efforts to find a new and better approach to problems in the conflict of laws. These efforts have certainly been made
with the best intentions; yet they have been halting and uneven.
There has been no clear break with the past. The cause of certainty
and predictability has not been advanced; on the contrary, vague
tests have been subjectively applied, so that the dominant impression
is one of confusion. And now one of the most important and
promising of New York's efforts has been successfully challenged on
constitutional grounds. A crisis of sorts is thus created; for if efforts
like those of New York are proscribed by fundamental law, there
is little hope for substantial progress in the analysis of conflict-of-laws
problems. New York has been groping for a principle that will inform and direct its efforts to find new and more satisfying solutions,
and at the same time be consistent with the Constitution. Does
such a principle exist? I believe it does. The principle is that New
York may and should apply its own laws to effectuate its own legitimate interests, defined with moderation and restraint in the light of
the interests of other states.
I
WRONGFUL DEATH-KILBERG

By now almost everyone knows about Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines;' and almost everyone who knows about the case has his own
opinion of it.
0 William R.

Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is indebted to

Mr. Girard E. Boudreau, Jr., of the Class of 1964, Duke University Law School, for
valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper.
19 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
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Mr. Kilberg, a resident of New York, purchased a ticket from
Northeast Airlines for a flight from New York to Nantucket, Massachusetts. He boarded the aircraft at La Guardia Airport; it crashed
and burned at Nantucket, killing tventy-three of those on board.2
Kilberg's administrator sued Northeast, a Massachusetts corporation,
in the Supreme Court of New York, setting forth in his first count a
claim under the Massachusetts death statute. Because that statute
limited recovery to a maximum of $15,000, a second count was
added, in which full indemnity3 was demanded on the theory that
the defendant had failed to perform its contractual obligation to
transport him safely. This rather novel characterization was not
without support in precedent. For example, when a railroad passenger sued for injuries sustained in Pennsylvania, and the defense
was that Pennsylvania law limited recovery to $3,000, the New York
court had treated the case as one arising from the contract of carriage,
and held New York law applicable. 4 Relying on that decision, the
trial court denied a motion to dismiss the second count. The
Appellate Division reversedA and the Court of Appeals affirmed
this rejection of the contract theory. Such free-wheeling characterization encounters conceptual difficulties in cases of wrongful death
as distinguished from simple personal injury: the cause of action is
purely statutory, and the precedents are clear that the applicable
law is that of the place of wrong. The second count must be dismissed, leaving only the count based on the Massachusetts statute.
The Court of Appeals did not stop there, however. The plaintiTfs recovery was not necessarily limited to $15,000 by the Massachusetts statute. It would be anomalous if the New York citizen's
protection against wrongful death were to vary as the aircraft moved
from state to state, and in accordance with the fortuitous place of
the crash. Since 1894 the Cofistitution of New York has prohibited
statutory limitations on the amount of recovery for wrongful death,
thus declaring a strong policy against such limitations. Moreover, it
was "open" to the New York court, "particularly in view of our own
strong public policy as to death action damages, to treat the measure
of damages as being a procedural or remedial question controlled
§ 1, p. 1, col. 4.
,[L]oss of accumulations of prospective earnings of the deceased." 9 N.Y.2d at 38,
172 N.E.2d at 527, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
'Dyke v. Erie Ry., 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
5 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 10 App. Div. 261, 198 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960).
*For an account of the accident see N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1958,
8
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by our own State policies." Therefore, while the judgment dismissing the contract count must be affirmed, the first count stood in
a new light: "[The] first count declaring under the Massachusetts
wrongful death action is not only sustainable but can be enforced,
if the proof so justifies, without regard to the $15,000 limit. Plaintiff, therefore, may apply if he be so advised for leave to amend his
first cause of action accordingly."
Judge Fuld concurred in the affirmance of the judgment dismissing the contract count, but would go no further: the question of
the damages recoverable under the first count was not presented by
the appeal, and had not been argued by counsel. As to the merits,
he would favor application of the New York law of wrongful death
as the law of the state having "the most significant contact or contacts,"" were this approdch not foreclosed by precedent. Judges
Froessel and Van Voorhis.also concurred in the judgment of affirmance only, protesting against the discussion of the amount recoverable under the first count. Unlike Judge Fuld, however, they
vehemently protested on the merits against the holding that the
$15,000 limitation of the Massachusetts statute was inapplicable,
going so far as to express "grave doubts as to the constitutionality of
the majority view."9
Since such a pother has been raised about the propriety of the
court's dealing with the first cause of action, when the appeal was
addressed only to the second, it may be well to discuss that matter
first. The judges in the minority were not alone in their objections.
The distinguished editors of a leading casebook have adopted the
unusual course of informing the student that the holding on this
score was "dictum."101 If the purpose is to warn the student that the
holding is not authoritative, and cannot be relied on as the law of
New York, this is hardly a helpful service, since it seems clear that
the majority of the Court of Appeals will continue to adhere to this
position unless and until it is definitively held unconstitutional.
When a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit was called upon to ascertain the New York law in the com69 N.Y.2d at 41-42, 172 N.E2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 137.
7
Id. at 42, 172 N.E.2d at 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 138.
8
1d. at 45, 172 N.E.2d at 531, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 140.
Id. at 46, 51, 172 N.E.2d at 532, 535, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 141, 146.
0
%
CHEATHAtM, GooDmict, GmiSWom S REESE, CASES ON CONrLIar OF LAWS, Supp. To
4Tm ED. 46 (1961). Normally casebook editors leave it to the student to distinguish
between dictum and ratio deddendi.
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panion case of Pearsonv. NortheastAirlines, the majority referred to
this aspect of Kilberg as "dictum" no less than seven times.11 Whatever the purpose,'2 it was certainly not to raise a doubt as to the
authoritative character of the holding as a statement of the law of
New York. The federal court of appeals, recognizing that the
district court in New York, sitting in a diversity case, was bound
under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins' 3 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Mfg. Co.' 4 to follow New York conflict-of-laws rules, indicated not
the slightest doubt that Kilberg stated the law of New York for this
purpose.
What, then, was so censurable about the majority's action in
passing on the first count? True, the narrow question on the appeal
was whether the second count should be dismissed. True, also, as
Judge Fuld emphasized, the question of disregarding the Massachusetts limitation while proceeding under the first count had not been
briefed or argued. But the substantial question was whether the
plaintiff was to be limited to a maximum recovery of $15,000. We
can be sure that neither party really cared whether, in the abstract,
an action in contract could be maintained; that was important only
as a means of avoiding the Massachusetts limitation. This being so,
what was the court to do when it reached the conclusion that the
contract theory would not wash, but that the limitation could and
should be avoided even under the tort theory of the first count? Does
due process require that the court withhold this information from
plaintiff's counsel, remanding the case so that-if they happen to
think of it-they can agonize over whether it is worth while to amend
the complaint and seek full indemnity under the Massachusetts
statute, thus precipitating another round of appeals? If the idea that
has commended itself to the majority of the court does not occur to
counsel, or if they judge the chances of its success too remote, the
plaintiff's right to adequate compensation is defeated. Justice
hardly requires such a result. The only meritorious criticism of
the court's action seems to be that of Judge Fuld, that the question
was not briefed or argued; but we may be sure that there was full
discussion of the question whether the Massachusetts limitation could
be avoided on some theory. That the argument did not embrace
2-1307 F.2d 131, 132, 133, 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1962).
="We think it inappropriate for this court to discuss the wisdom or the soundness
of the majority's dictum, and there is no necessity of our doing so." Id. at 133.
2' 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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the particular theory adopted by the court seems rather unimportant.
Apart from this point, the criticism of the court's action as a matter
of procedure smacks too much of the formalities of the common law.
In the twentieth century it is anachronistic to complain because a
court tells a litigant that though he cannot recover in contract he
may in tort, or that though he cannot recover in trespass he may in
an action on the case. Or does the theory that a lawsuit is a battle
of wits between opposing counsel still prevail?
On the merits the holding that the Massachusetts limitation
should be disregarded was certainly unconventional. It had two
aspects, each highly vulnerable to traditional criticism and provocative of attack on constitutional grounds. The proposition that the
measure of damages is a matter of procedure governed by the law
of the forum is in conflict with overwhelming authority; and, indeed,
once one concedes that for some reason the rights of the parties are
governed by the law of a foreign state, it is difficult to justify rejection of the foreign law as to the measure of damages. Ordinarily,
at least, application of that law will not cause inconvenience, nor
does the corresponding law of the forum relate to policies of judicial
administration. In fact, the New York Court of Appeals has since
felt constrained to withdraw this ground of its decision in Kilberg.1 6
The remaining ground for the decision is similarly vulnerable to
traditional criticism. Impressive judicial names can be invoked in
support of the proposition that, while "local public policy" may
justify a court's refusing to entertain a cause of action based on
foreign law, it cannot properly justify rejection of a defense based on
the foreign law. Thus Mr. Justice Brandeis:
But the Company is in a position different from that of a plaintiff who
seeks to enforce a cause of action conferred by the laws of another
State. The right which it claims should be given effect is set up by way
of defense to an asserted liability; and to a defense different considerations apply. Compare Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407,
408. A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of
action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unimpaired the
plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to enforce it elsewhere.
But to refuse to give effect to a substantive defense under the applicable
law of another State, as under the circumstances here presented, subjects
the defendant to irremediable liability. This may not be done.16
15 Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
16 Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 160 (1932).
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And Mr. Justice Holmes:
It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the foundation of his case, and yet to deny the
defendant the benefit of whatever limitations on his liability that law
would impose. 17
Despite the eminence of Justices Brandeis and Holmes, this
reasoning involves a subtle fallacy, as we shall see. And despite the
vulnerability of the Kilberg reasoning to traditional criticism, the
decision reaches a sound result. The question whether a ceiling
should be placed on the liability of the wrongdoer who takes human
life-like the earlier question, whether such a wrongdoer shall be
liable at all-involves a conflict of domestic interests. This conflict
has been resolved in different ways by Massachusetts and New York.
In Massachusetts the interests of those whose activities create substantial risk of injury and death-specifically, carriers-have been
preferred. In New York the interests of the victim and his dependents have been preferred. Prior to 1894 the New York legislature
had imposed limitations; but in that year the constitutional convention resolved the conflict in favor of the victim and his dependents, and wrote its policy decision into fundamental law. Legislative
restrictions on the damages recoverable were, in the judgment of
New York's lawmakers, "absurd and unjust."' 8 Rejecting all arguments to the effect that unlimited liability for death "might be the
ruin and impoverishment of small corporations, partnerships, and
individuals,"' 9 the convention declared in favor of fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from death.
It is evident from this debate, and the arguments used, that this amendment was adopted for the benefit of the next of kin of the bread winner,persons who in fact sustained large pecuniary damage on account of the
negligent act which removed the person, and deprived persons dependent
thereon of their sustenance, and which was not measured or recompensed
by the sum awarded under the limitation.20
Massachusetts decided the policy issue the other way, protecting the
interest of the tortfeasor. But Kilberg was a citizen of New York.
27 Slater v. Mexican Nat'l. R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
1
'Hatch,
J., in Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 6 App. Div. 42, 46, 39 N.Y.
Supp. 618, 616 (1896), quoted in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 39, 40, 172
N.E.2d
526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 186 (1961).
2 9Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R.,., supra note 18.
20 Ibid.
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Why, in such a case, should New York abandon its own policy in
favor of the contrary policy of Massachusetts, with its "absurd and
unjust" limitation on the liability of the tortfeasor?2 '
It may be interesting to approach this question, as well as the
objections to the Kilberg decision on the merits, by way of the
published comments on the decision. The law reviews in New
York were particularly critical. The Albany Law Review summed
up its discussion of the decision thus:
The results attained by the Kilberg decision have some merit in the
light of modern means of travel and the consequent frequent movement
from one state to another. The disadvantages, however, would seem to
far outweigh the advantages. As a matter of policy the amount of
damages should not be made dependent upon plaintifFs choice of
forum, nor should a defendant be subjected to varying limits of damages
for injuries arising out of the same transaction. According to logic
and principle, the reparation to be afforded should depend upon the law
of the jurisdiction giving rise to the obligation. 22
The Columbia Law Review, in a more ambitious and sophisticated
critique, said:
The place of wrong rule has certain important pragmatic advantages that favor its continued use. It is relatively easy to apply, since
determination of the place of wrong depends on factors that are usually
readily discerned and proved. Furthermore, it achieves objectivity in the
selection of law, since it is not ordinarily susceptible to the intrusion of
local influences or judicial whims. Thirdly, the elements that lend
simplicity and objectivity also make the result of choice of law relatively
predictable, an important factor in facilitating settlement of tort daims.
The Court of Appeals failed to indicate any circumstances in the
instant case that could be said to support a finding that New York had
a distinctly greater governmental interest than Massachusetts. It seems
21

An element of unreality is injected into the discussion by the fact that, on remand,
Kilberg's administrator did not amend the first count to claim damages in excess of
the Massachusetts limit, but accepted less than $15,000 in settlement. See Pearson v.
Northeast Airlines, 307 F.2d 131, 132 n.3 (2d Cir. 1962). This appears to have been
because Kilberg was a young man with no dependents at the time of his death.
Thus the Kilberg decision was of no help to the plaintiff in the Kilberg case; his hope
of recovering more than the maximum was based on the belief that loss of accumulations of prospective earnings was the appropriate measure of damages on the contract
theory. But under the wrongful-death theory the measure of damages was pecuniary
loss to dependents. Letter from Lee S. Kreindler, Esquire, counsel for plaintiff in the
Kilberg case. The issue is not always so academic: in the Pearson case, to be discussed
in Part II, infra, the jury's verdict was for $133,943.77. Id. at 132, 137.
2225 ALBANY L. RV. 313, 317 (1961).
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cldar that the significant- territorial interests in the case were those of
Massachusetts, and in view of the defendant's domicile in Massachusetts,
the decedent's domicile in New York did not create a dominant countervailing interest in the latter state. Therefore, it is doubtful that this
23
was a proper case for departure from the place of wrong rule.
The New York University Law-Review concluded:
. Possible constitutional issues aside, the Kilberg dictum represents an
unsound choice of law....
What6er may b'e said of the legal reasoning contained in the Kilberg
opinioi,- it is uidehiable that the-majority kept faith with the prevalent
policy against- limitation of -damages, as expressed in the New York
constituttion. - Bearing in-mind-that the place of an airplane crash is
dompletely fortuitous, the result., in.terms of this policy, seems-to be just.
A-115;000 limitation (or any limitation"at all) is an unreasonable standaid by -which to measure the lives of all human beings. On the other
hand; tb classify damages as proctdizral opens the way to forum-shopping.
The plaintiff, by choosing the forum, is able to control which law will be
applied.. The Kilberg court thus defeats one of the objects of the law
of conflict of laws,-namely, uniformity of result wherever suit is brough t2

The.Syracuse Law Review in a brief note said:
To:accept -a-statutory-cause of action yet disregard its limitations
evidences -a retreat from general conflict of laws principles. The court.
appears to" have been affected by that group of legal theorists who.
ddvocate that- most choice of lav problems be solved by application of
the. forum's internal law.. The purpose .of a-conflict of laws system is
to -preclude a Variance in the outcome of lawsuits according to the place
where the action is brought. The decision of the instant case if
followed by other jurisdictions would frustrate this purpose ....
25 ....
Outside New York there was also adverse comment, though that
of the -GeorgetownLaw Journal was somewhat ambivalent:
The subterrafean- iationale disclosed by- this effort is clearly the
court's legitimate wish to provide relief fQr persons in whom New York
Wai'li strbng.interest, not only as their prospective guardian, but equally
.asthepulblic- power concerned with the social and economic well-being.
23 Commejit, 61 CoLr. L_. Rzv."1497, 1509, 1511 (1961).
.1Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 728, 727, 729-30 (1961). Surprisingly, the comment
goes on .tosuggest, as a possible solution of.. the. difficulty, that New York adopt the,
"contract approach" of th6 second count by statute. Id. at 730.
WM12.SXRcusa L. Riii. 995, 397 (1961). The theorists cited were Cook, Cuirie and
Ehrenzweig. ' t'he comment raiher oversimplifies the theory of at least one of these, and*
I should think of all three.
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of all its citizens. Whether such admirable motivation must always be
implemented by decisions marred by a provincialism which hampers the
growth of nationally uniform conflict-of-laws rules remains unanswered:
It simply always has been. One alternative response to situations such
as that posed by Kilberg lies with New York frankly reversing itself
and.. . giving extraterritorial effect to its own wrongful -death statute .... 2
The Rutgers Law Review was less restrained. Under the headline,
"Misuse of Substance-Procedure and Public Policy Concepts," it
pronounced:
This view tends to negate both the rationale of certain conflict of laws
rules and the reason for their existence-namely, to prevent the outcome
of a lpwsuit from differing according to the place chosen to institutd
the suit. Conflict of laws rules are not mere rubrics without reason to
be manipulated by courts so as to achieve -a solution to a valid choice
9f law "problem which satisfies their own notions of justice and public
policy. In the interests of continued stability and usefulness of conflict
of laws rules, it is hoped that this virtually unique decision will remain
unique.2 7
The Virginia Law Review, after quoting Gardozo (another great
judge, be it noted) on the yielding.of the theory of thd statute
personal to principles of the territorial system and the doctrine of
vested rights,28 and after.some worried comments about forum shop
ping, coftcluded:
At the very least, it seems ciear that whatever benefit the instant court
has performe~d for its own citizens, it has by reviving and giving vit lity
to an old and discarded rule, undermined the certainty 'which was the
legacy of the stable pattern of conflict of law rules which had develqpe'd
in this area over the.years.29
For the purposes of this discussion no such detailed survey of the
favorable reaction is necessary. The outstanding law-review comments are those in the University of Chicago Law Review 0 and.th
Harvard Law Review. s
Other generally favorable comments are
cited in the footnote.8 2 The present purpose is to examine -thd
adverse reaction to the decision.
To some extent, not adequately reflected in the excerpts that
Go. LJ. 768, 773-74 (1961).
15 RuroPs L. REv. 620, 624 (1961).
28 47 VA. L. Rav. 692, 696 n.27 (1961).
' Id. at 697.
20 28 U. Cm. L. Rav. 733 (1961).
.
74 HARY. L. REv. 1652 (1961).
' EHMNZWEI,
CONE-=Cr or LAws 552-56 (1962); 15'Aia. L. REv. 187 (19.1)j.41
B.U.L. Ray. 257 (1961); 27 BRooLYN L. RV. 36 (1961); 49 CAns'. L. Rv. 187
2649

DUKE LAW JO URNVAL

[Vol. 1963: 1

have been quoted, the opposition is motivated by fidelity to the
principles of territorial jurisdiction and vested rights. In part it is
motivated simply by the unconventionality of the decision, by the
shock that comes with discovery that rules that have been taught,
learned, and hardly questioned cannot be trusted. In part it is a
reaction against the court's manipulation of traditional concepts, as
opposed to a forthright application of New York law, to achieve a
desired result forbidden by the traditional system. Passing these
matters, passing also criticisms addressed to the procedural char-

acterization, since withdrawn by the court,33 and considering only
the pragmatic arguments advanced by the critics, we find a common
concern for the simplicity, uniformity, certainty, and predictability
that have been advertised over the years as the significant values
of the traditional system of conflict of laws.
To this position certain concessions must be made. Specifically,
if we assume that all states will agree that the law of the place of
injury governs on substantive matters of tort liability; and if we
assume that all states will concur in characterizing the problem, in
cases of the Kilberg type, as one of tort (rather than, say, one of
contract); and if we assume that all states will concur in characterizing the measure of damages as a matter of substance rather than
as one of procedure; and if we assume that no state would reject
the law of the place of injury on grounds of local public policy; then
the following propositions must be conceded:
1. The applicable law is ascertained with comparative ease, since
the locality test is relatively (though not always) simple to apply.
2. All victims of the crash would be treated alike, in the sense
that the same standards would be applied to determine the right
to recover and the measure of recovery.
3. The result in a particular case would not vary according t6
where the action is brought (subject to valid exceptions concerning
procedure, based on convenience of trial and considerations relating
to judical administration); thus the incentives for forum-shopping
would be minimized.
4. After the accident has happened, the outcome of each indi(1961); 46 CoRNmaz L.Q. 637 (1961); 30 U. CrNc. L. REv. 511 (1961); 15 VAND. L. lV.
271 (1961).
For an unclassifiable comment see Keefe, 48 A.BAJ. 971; id., 48 A.B.AJ. 491, 493-94
(1962).
. See note 15 supra.
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vidual case would be reasonably predictable, since the body of
applicable law is then known; and this would facilitate settlements.
All this is true. But what the commentators on Kilberg-like
most commentators on the conflict of laws-overlook is that these
same values would be realized if the rule were that substantive
matters of tort liability shall be governed by the law of Alaska. (The
reader may substitute the District of Columbia, or Mississippi, or
Rwanda, or Burundi, or any other state, ad libitum.) Indeed, such
a rule would realize these values even better than the rule that the
law of the state of the wrong governs. While the state of the -wrong
is determined with relative ease, it is sometimes difficult to determine, as where the wrongful conduct and the injury occur in
different states, or where the injury is to an intangible interest such
as the interest in reputation. All such problems would be avoided if
we could agree in advance that the law of a named state, such as
Alaska, would govern. All victims would be treated alike, as under
the place-of-wrong rule; the result would not vary according to where
the action is brought, and forum-shopping would be minimized.
As for predictability, the Alaska rule would have an enormous
advantage over the place-of-wrong rule; for the outcome of each
case would be reasonably predictable not only after, but also before,
the accident. Let those who are concerned about the expectations
of the parties, and about planning for business enterprises, and about
insurability4 reflect upoh this. Would it not be to the advantage of
both the passenger and the airline to know in advance, before any
crash occurs and, indeed, before any flight plan is filed, that all
claims for injury and death will be governed by the law of Alaska?
The text of that law could even be posted in airport waiting rooms,
alongside the insurance-vending machines, as the laws on innkeepers' liability are posted inside the door of a hotel room.
Why, then, if these values, or ideals, are so important, do we not
adopt the Alaska type of rule so as to achieve them more fully? Our
friends the critics of the Kilberg decision, impatient with what they
would doubtless regard as unseemly trifling with serious matters,
would reply: Naturally, because the applicable law must have something to do with the case, and Alaska obviously has nothing to do with
" See EMMnNZWZIG, Coruc oF LAws (1962), passim. Cf. Morris, Enterprise Li.
ability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 71) YA= L.J. 554
(1961).
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the Kilberg case.* But it is not impertinent to inquire: Why niust
,the governing law have something to do with the case? Certain
pragmatic values of the traditional system have been cited; those
values can be attained as well or better by a rule referring to the law
of Alaska. Why then should w insist on a connection between
th6 state of Alaska and thd Kilberg case?
.The 'pragmatic" virtues of the rule referring to the law of
Alaska are quite independent of the content of that law. Yet that
law must express some sort of policy; like other states, Alaska has had
to resolve the internal conflict of interests that England resolved in
Lord Campbell's Act.35 One purpose, at least, of a conflict-of-laws
system is, or should be, to effectuiate the policies of the states concerned; but if Alaska has no relation to the parties, the events, or
the litigation, its policy-its resolution of the internal conflict of
interests-is irrelevant. Therefore the rule that the law of Alaska
shall govern is unacceptable, despite its superior pragmatic values.
But it is equially true that any rule must be rejected, despite its
pragmatic values, if the state whose law is thereby invoked has no
interest in the application of its policy. One of the drawbacks of
the place-of-wrong rule is that it sometimes-though perhaps less
often than some other choice-of-law rules-commands application of
the law of a state having no more concern with the*matter than
Alaska has with the Kilberg case.30
The rule would not operate in quite that irrational way in
kilberg. Massachusetts was related to the case in a way significant
for the application of Massachusetts policy. This is not evident,
however, .from the mere fact that the injury occurred there. It does
not suffice to say:
When wrongful conduct and- injury, or either of them, occur within the
territorial confines of a state, that state usually has- a clear and significant interest in having its law applied to litigation that may result
from such events. This interest arises from the right and duty of the
sovereign to.protect those within its borders from injury to person or
property and, correspondingly, its prerogative to permit individuals to
3r 9 & 10 viCL c. 93 (1846).

. See Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of
Laws, 10 STAN. L. Ray. 205 (1958), discussing Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264

P.2d 944- (1958), which rejects the law of the place of the wrong with respect to the
qqetion whether a claim for personal injuries survives the tortfeasor. In'the circumstances, the policy of the state of the wrong was irrelevant.
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engage in. ceriain kinds of 'conduct, within' constitutional limits, without

incurring liability.3 7
'It is true that the state of wrongful conduct or injury. normally has
an interest in applying eftain of its policies:- e..g., an interest in
'deterring dangerous conduct, and an interest in requiring reparationf,
-if not primarily for the victim, at least for the protection of those
who go to his aid. In cases of wrongful death as distinguished from
simple injury, -however, itmay be that the state has not declared the
policy that must underlie such an interest. If the Ndrtheast Airlines
crash had occurred in a state having no other connection with the
parties, the events, or the litigation, and having _a statute more
closely resemblihg Lord Campbell's Act than the Massachusetts
statute does, it would be difficult to find such a policy. The more
typical statute provides for recovery only if-the deceased is survived
by certain classes of beneficiaries -who suffer pecuniary loss, and the
proceeds of recovery are not subject to claims of creditors of the
deceased or his estate. Hence the- statute declares k policy of
deterring wrongful conduct only imperfectly, and declares no policy
at all for the protection of local creditors. In such a case application of the law of the place of irijury may be so unwarranted as to
constitute a denial of full faith and credit to the laws of the state
having a genuine interest in the matter, and the United States
Supreme Court has so held (though not in just these terms). 38 The
Massachusetts statute is different. More clearly than the typical
wrongful death act, it expresses a policy of deterAng dangerous conduct: there is a minimum as well as a maximum -recovery; the
damages are measured not by pecuniary loss but by the degree of

the defendant's culpability 39 if there is'no surviving spouse or issue,
the proceeds go to the next of kin;40 and the proceeds Are expressly
made subject to claims for funeral expenses, medical and hospital
expenses, and reasonable attorney's fees incurred in their recovery. 4X
-Thus Massachusetts has an interest in the application of certain
aspects of its law'v merely because the wrongful conduct and the
injury occurred there. But with respect to these matters there is' no
obvious conflict of interest between Massachusetts and New York, at
Comment, 61 CoLubr. L. Rav. 1497, 1510 (1961).
SaBradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), discussed in Currie,
Thq Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. CH..L. R.v. 9, 23-30 .(1961).
'
-es. ANN. LAwS ch. 229, §2 '(1955). "MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 229, § 1.
" Nf,%ss. ANN. LAWS dh. '229, § 6A.
37
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least in the context .of Kilberg; to award the plaintiff more than
$15,000 will tend to reinforce, rather than to frustrate, the Massachusetts policies of deterring wrongful conduct and protecting creditors. 42 This is a perhaps overly complex way of stating a proposition
so simple that it ought to be obvious: it is a non sequitur to say
that, because, by virtue of being the place of the wrong, Massachusetts has an interest in deterring wrongful conduct and in securing
the payment of local creditors, Massachusetts also has an interest
in limiting the liability of the defendant.
43
Yet the passage from the Columbia comment just quoted
appears to set forth precisely this nonsequitur. Either that, or it
sets forth another quite unacceptable proposition: that because of
territorial principles the sovereign has the "prerogative to permit
individuals [whoever they may be] to engage in certain kinds of
conduct [within the territory], within constitutional limits, without
incurring liability." Despite the absolutist sound of this manifesto,
I shall assume that there is no intention to suggest that the state
where the conduct occurs has exclusive power to determine its consequences. Otherwise we should be confronted with the rather
unpalatable proposition that Massachusetts could repeal its wrongful
death statute entirely, thus conferring on all and sundry a license
to kill with impunity in Massachusetts-a license that must be
respected by all other states, no matter who the victim may be. The
kind of thinking that might support such an extreme proposition
is happily extinct in responsible quarters.4 4 I take it, therefore, that
the comment means to suggest only that the state where conduct
occurs has an interest in insulating the actor from liability for conduct that it approves or condones, not that it has the sole voice in the
matter. But the proposition is unacceptable even with this limitation. Let us assume that it is the policy of a certain state that
12In another context, however, conflict is conceivable. Since New York law provides
for no minimum recovery and measures recovery solely in terms of pecuniary loss,
the amount of the judgment may be insufficient, by Massachusetts standards, to implement the deterrent policy.
There appears to be no conflict regarding protection of Massachusetts creditors, since
the New York statute seems to provide full protection. See N.Y. DECEDFNT EsrAT
LAW § 133. Cf. Re Procopio, 149 Misc. 347, 267 N.Y. Supp. 908 (1933).
"At note 37 supra.
"1For the interment of the philosophy expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in American

Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.,
344 U.S. 280, 288-89 (1952), and Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,

370 U.S. 690, 704-08 (1962).
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there shall be no liability, or only limited liability, for wrongful
death. In what circumstances will the state have an interest in
applying that policy? We need to know more precisely what the
policy is. Presumably it is not to encourage people within the
state's borders to live dangerously, to practice for the edification of
the community the most hazardous skills, sports, and games. Presumably it has some serious purpose. In a law-school classroom we
can imagine fax-out possibilities: the state wishes to stage, for the
increase of its revenues and the edification of its people, a duel to
the death between the world's finest swordsmen, who happen to be
nonresidents. To be induced to participate they must be given
immunity. In such a case the state has an interest in the application
of its policy of nonliability for local conduct though the actors are
'nonresidents. In any realistic setting, however, we are likely to find
that the concern of the state is with the people involved rather than
the scene of the activity. Thus the American policy of limiting the
liability of shipowners is to encourage American investment and
enterprise in the shipping industry; the activity, it is hoped, will be
world-wide, but the American shipowner will be protected by American courts irrespective of where the activity results in injury.4 5
Similarly, the Massachusetts policy of limiting liability for wrongful death is presumably to encourage socially useful enterprise by
relieving entrepreneurs from what the legislature regards as an
oppressive risk of liability. It is therefore appropriate, and necessary, to ask: What entrepreneurs? And the answer, surely, is: those
with whose welfare Massachusetts is concerned; namely, Massachusetts individuals, partnerships, trusts, corporations, and quite possibly foreign corporations doing business in Massachusetts. The
Massachusetts interest rests not on the conduct within the state but
on the state's concern for the entrepreneur.
This kind of analysis is important in consideration of the assumed
case in which the state where the conduct and injury occurred has
no other connection with the matter. Such a state, I believe, would
have no interest in the application of its limitation provision (assuming a statute like the Massachusetts statute), and to follow the
placeof-wrong rule in such a case would be simply indefensible.
.. lberg is not such a case. Northeast Airlines is a Massachusetts
" See Comment, 1962 DuxE L.J. 259.
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corporation, doing substantial business within the state. Massachrtsetts has a legitimate interest in limiting its 'liability for deaths
occuring in the course of its business. But the foregoing analysis is
also relevant to the Kilberg case because it is important, in a case
of truly conflicting interests, to know just what the int~rests of the
respective states are. It is especially important to know this so long
-as there are commentators who presume to "weigh" the conflicting
interests and choose between them, since the ethereal scales used in
this process can be tipped when illusory interests are thrown into
the balance. The conflict in Kilberg is simple and clear: Massachusetts has a policy of encouraging enterprise by relieving it of the
risk of unlimited liability for death; it has an interest in the application of that policy in Kilberg biecause the defendant is a Massachusetts enterprise. Massdchusetts has no interest in the application
of its limitation policy merely because the wrongful conduct occurred there, or because the injury occurred there, or because the
death occurred there. New York has a policy of requiring the
vrongdoer to provide full indemnity for the death, and has an
interest in the application of its policy in Kilberg because the victim
and his next of kin ivere residents of New York. New York has no
interest in applying its law and policy merely because the ticket
was purchased there, or because the flight originated there.4 0 New
York's policy is not for the protection of all who buy tickets in New
York, or board planes there. It is for the protection of New York
47
people.
" This is recognized in the CouMBA comment, 61 CoLUMt. L. REV. at 1511.
It begs the question to suggest, as the Rutrcs comment, supra note 27, apparently
does, that choice-of-law rules themselves embody the policy of the state. The question is whether choice-of-law rules intelligently further the specific policies embodied
in the state's municipal law. See Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the
Forum, 58 COLUm. L. RFv. 964, 1007 (1958).
4
TSome of the comments on the case express concern about the.problems of discrimination suggested by this statement. it is not practicable here to consider that
somewhat intricate problem. It must suffice to say, first, that the statement in the text
'does not mean that the benefits of New York law are to be xeserved exclusively for New
-York people; that there are cases in which New York would be required to extend its
benefits to others; that there are other cases in which New York might withhold those
benefits from others on the basis of reasonable classifications; and that there are, finally,
cases in which the extension of those benefits to otheis would amount to intermeddling
rther than altruism, and would be condemned under the Constitution. The subject
is discussed in Currie. & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of
Laws: Privilegesand Immunities, 69 YAM L.E. 1323 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in- the-Conflict of -Laws: Equal Protection, 28 U. CHI. L.,,Rv.
1 (1960). See also Part II, infra.

Vol. 196S.1]

, CONFLICT.OF LAWS

17

How, then, is this conflict to be resolved? It cannot be resolved
with the resources of the law of conflict of laws. You and I know, of
.course, which is the better law, .which is the sounder policy, which
is the more deserving interest. We know .that, however, because
we are human beings and lawyers-af-large, not because of what we
-know about the conflict of laws. And -te do not make the laws for
Massachusetts and New York. The conflict might be destroyed by
the legislature of New York, or of Massachusetts, if either were, to
amend its law so as to withdraw it from application to cases of this
type. It might have been avoided if the New York Court of Appeals
had construed its law and policy more narrowly. It could be
-destroyed by an act of Congress, pursuant to the power to regulat6
.interstate commerce, establishing a uniform rule of liability. It
could be resolved by an act of Congress pursuant to its power to
implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 8 Once the New York
court has determined, however, what the New York policy is, and
that New York's interest demands application of the policy in this
'type of case, it is the court's clear duty to apply New York iav.
Assuming that the Massachusetts court is equally firm in its conception o that state's policy and interest, it must similarly apply its
own law to cases that come before it. Neither can properly sacrifice
the interest of the state whose creature it is to the conflicting interest
of another state, whether this be done outright by a concession that
the foreign interest is "paramount," or by a finding that there are
more significant "contacts" with the foreign state, or by application
of the rule of thumb that. the law of the place of wrong controls.
Nor can the United States Supreme Court properly choose between
the conflicting interests. 9
The reaction to the Kilberg decision makes it clear that there
are those who regard this answer as intolerable. Such a conflict must
-be resolved by the courts somehow; we cannot admit defeat for the
conflict-of-laws system. What has become of the values of the
system-of simplicity, equality of treatment for the victims of the
.disaster, uniformity of result regardless of forum, ahd predictability?
But our~ discussibn has' indicated that, however much those values
IsSee. CooK, .TELoGICAL AND LEGAL BASES or THE Corruacr or LAws 9Y-107
.(1942), originally published -as The Powers of Congress inder the Full Faith and
-Credit Clause, 28 YA.E L.J. 421 (1919)..
"9See Part II, infra.
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are to be desired, they cannot be pursued without regard to the
interests of the states concerned. Any conceivable choice-of-law
rule will subvert the legitimate interest of one state or the other.
Which is to be subordinated, and who is to decide? Most of the
aggrieved commentators would simply go back to the rule of
thumb, whereby the fate of the respective interests is determined by
chance: where did the plane strike the ground? The Columbia
Law Review would do the same, though in its sophistication it
would rationalize that course by (1) erecting a presumption, on
territorialist principles, in favor of the law of the place of the wrong,
(2) appraising the "territorial contacts" and the "domiciliar contacts" of the respective states with the case, and then (3) in its
wisdom concluding that New York did not have "a distinctly greater
governmental interest" than Massachusetts.
It seems dear that the significant territorial interests in the case were
those of Massachusetts, and in view of the defendant's domicile in Massachusetts, the decedents domicile in New York did not create a dominant
countervailing interest in the latter state. Therefore, it is doubtful
that this was a proper case for departure from the place of wrong rule. 0
Those who are concerned for governmental interests may well raise
an eyebrow at this cavalier dismissal of the interest of New York.
Those who are concerned for simplicity, certainty, and predictability
may well be apprehensive about the prospect that the place-of--wrong
rule may be displaced by such analysis in the hands of other weighmasters.
It was suggested earlier that the values claimed for the traditional
system of conflict of laws could be attained as well or better by a
rule referring to the law of a predetermined state, designated by
name. Obviously no one would take seriously such a suggestion if
it were offered as a proposal for reform, since it ignores governmental interests entirely. Let us now improve on that device by suggesting another that does take account of governmental interests:
the measure of damages in wrongful death cases shall be determined
by the law of that state which provides for the greater recovery.
(The reader may substitute "more limited" for "greater.") Such
a rule would achieve the values claimed for the traditional system
even better than the place-of-wrong rule; in addition, it would make
50 61

COLUm. L. REv. at 1511.

Vol. 1963: 1]

CONFLICT OF LAWS

a forthright choice between the conflicting policies.

19
What would

be its chances of adoption if it were proposed as a substitute for the
place-of-wrong rule? Precisely because it does deal forthrightly with
the policy conflict, only the most visionary theorist could seriously
contemplate a conflict-of-laws system constructed in substantial part
on this principle. Perhaps a few such rules could win acceptance, in

areas in which courts are disposed for some reason to define domestic

interests narrowly;5 ' but where the policy of the state is strorig and
the interest is clear, it is inconceivable that a court would adopt a
rule that would sacrifice domestic interests in every case of conflict.
How could Massachusetts possibly justify retention of its limitation
policy for domestic purposes while proclaiming that in all cases of
conflict that policy must yield to the contrary policy of another state?
It is too clear that the court is arrogating to itself a legislative prerogative; it is too clear that domestic interests are betrayed.
It seems evident that those who cling to the traditional system of
choice-of-law rules are people who place a low valuation on the
principle of self-determination. They want life to be as nearly as
possible what it would be if there were not a variety of differeni
governments enacting different laws, reflecting different values.
They are annoyed because different peoples solve their problems in
different ways, because this adds complexity to life. At heart they
are probably people of the type who would solve as many problems
as possible at the highest political level. The basic conflict of policy
involved in Kilberg they would probably prefer to deal with on a
global basis-and some melancholy progress in that direction has been
made in the Warsaw Convention;5 2 they would welcome an act of
Congress superseding state laws where interstate air transportation is
concerned. They are probably among the strong advocates of
uniform state laws. It is not so much that they-the conflict-of-laws
traditionalists, that is-believe they have all the right answers. They
do not care much what the answer is, so long as it is the same everywhere. They are impatient with the little affairs with which legislators and diplomats concern themselves, and think it does not really
' As to the policy against usury, see Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274
Cf. the advocacy of a "basic rule of validation" for choice of law in

U.S. 403 (1927).

contract cases. Em zwEiG, CONfLIcr OF LAws 465 (1962).

112
Convention and Additional Protocol with Other Powers Relating to International
Air Transportation, July 31, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (proclaimed October 29,

1934).
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matter much how questions of governmental policy are determined.
They want security, simplicity, equality, uniformity, and predictablity. They treat these values as near absolutes, to be yielded only
in the most exceptional circumstances. They are uncomfortably
aware that this is not yet one world, and that perverse legislative
bodies will go on provincially adopting conflicting policies; but in
their own realm they are determined to pretend that this is not so.
They want litigation involving diverse laws to proceed almost exactly
as if there were one super-government, so that every case will be
decided as if it were a case domestic to such a government: one law
mist apply; all victims of the crash must be treated alike; any
individual case must be 'decided the same way by any court. So,
where they cannot have a treaty or an act of Congress or a uniform
state law, they propose a choice-of-law rule-thit is, a rule that will
designate one state whose law shall be applied by all states. They do
iot propose that all states apply the law of the state limiting (or not
limiting) liability, because no such rule would stand a chance of
being accepted; its acceptance requires the overt sacrifice of state
interests. Instead they propose a rule that makes no reference to
conflicts of governmental interest-a rule, indeed, that ignores even
the content of the laws, involved. They conceal and suppress thd
fact that state interests are sacrificed. If the fact is exposed, they
tell us that governmental interdsts are not very important, and
extol the values of uniformity. If we persist, they talk about the
territorial prerogatives of the sovereign, but not much about what
mnakes one state -moresovereign than another. If we point out that
the proposed rule .does not deal rationally with the conflict of
interests, but ignores its existence while letting .the result turn on a
factor determined.by chance, they will shrug in reply. The rule at
least avoids discussion of the competing values involved; Agreement
on the basic issue is hopeless; hence the law must be made without
reference to the values at issue. If we suggest that the rule will
subvert state interests in the,5ame way as a rule pointing to the law
of limited (or unlimited) liability, they will reply that this is not so;
it will subvert the interest of a particular state only half the time.
TIhe rest of the time it will subvert the interest of the other state.
If we suggest that such a, rule displays slight concern for the concept
bf justice under law, we are told: "The introduction of elements of
fairness to individuals affected by the litigation and respect for in-
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terests of states other than the place of wrong must, it appears,
inevitably jeopardize the attainment of these'values" 3-the values of
simplicity, "objectivity" (meaning the exclusion- of "local influences"), and predictability. Hence: "'Fairness to the parties would
not appear to be a material factor in the [Kilberg] case."' 5
In this comer, then, we have the proponents of the traditional
system of conflict-of-laws, the most vocal of them law students and
their professors. In the far corner we have .the recalcitrants, judges,
like-Chief judge Desmond and the majority of the New York Court
of Appeals, who cannot swallow whole. a system that disregards state.
interests and fairness to the parties. As between these groups, who
are the practical men, the realists, and who are the "theorists"? 55
Perhaps we can recognize error in others better than in ourselves.
There are countries in which doctrinaie-.adherence to the arbitrary
system of choice-of-law rules and contempt for governmental policy
have approached the level of obsession. In .order to illustrate the
functioning of foreign choice-of-law rules relating to contracts of
marriage, Rabel-states the following case:,
An American citizen domiciled in New York, while.temporarily residing
in Germany, seduced a German girl by pfomising'to marry her and subsequently repudiated his -promise. The German court denied-the girl's
action, holding that the German conflict of laws rules referred to the
law of New York as the personal law of the defendant, under which

actions for breach of promise to marry are not recognized. 58

Rabel states the case without comment; 57 it is Toutine, there is
nothing remarkable about it. Bit one who reads his account of this

decision without' the distorting lenses of the choice-of-lait system
must be incredulous. Is it possible that a German court could
have made such a 'decision? If so, was it some Nazi aberration?
I have seen the report of the decision, and it is no aberration. Tfiej
holding is that "the consequences of a breach of an engagement to'
Inarry are to be determined in accordance with the law of the nationalfty of the obligor." The foreign law may be rejected on policy
grounds only if "the difference between the political or social
ideas upon which the German and the foreign law iLre based is so'
'1Ibid.
2'61 COLUmm. L.Rr v. at 1510.
USee note 25 supra.
1161 RA mr, Tim-CoNruar oF LAws: A ComPARATmv SruI0y 219 (2d e'd. 1958).
37Except to deplore occasional departures fiom te rule on grounds of publi"
policy as "obviously arbitrary." Id. at 220..
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substantial that an application of the foreign law would directly
offend against the basic principles of German public or economic
life." s The decision has recently been disapproved on the ground
that, while the choice-of-law rule is correct "in principle," the
German law embodies a policy of protection for women that ought
to be applied where the woman is a German. 9 The latter decision,
however, has provoked anguished criticism from the traditionalists,
comparable to the criticism of Kilberg.00
And now the Constitution of the United States is invoked to
preserve such a system against such inroads of common sense.
II
FULL FArrH AND CREDIT-PEARSON

The direct challenge to the constitutionality of Kilberg came in
Pearsonv. Northeast Airlines, a parallel case arising from the same
accident but tried in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.0 ' Both the district court and the
court of appeals recognized that New York conflict-of-laws rules
were controlling, and that Kilberg authoritatively stated the law of
S8KaXmmergericht, January 11, 1939, reported in [1939] DEUIScHEs REclr 1012.
I am indebted to my colleague, Professor Hans W. Baade, for translating the case
and also for calling to my dttention as well as translating the case cited in note 59,
infra, and the critical comments on it.
SS.U. v. K., 28 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [Decisions of
the Federal (Supreme) Court in Civil Matters] 575 (November 21, 1958).
"The decision] also is opposed to long-lasting and constantly repeated attempts
to take the exceptional character of public policy very seriously and to exclude the
applicability of foreign law only where applying it would be utterly unbearable....
IThe ideal goal of an international harmony of judicial decisions is threatened by
public policy, and.., the latter should therefore only be used where there is no other
solution. .-.
. [German courts and authors generally] have disapproved that legal
'Chauvinism' which could sometimes be observed in the theory and practice of other
countries and which today seems to be displaced more and more by an increasingly
international approach. In this stage of developments, the decision of the German
federal supreme court here discussed must give rise to consternation." Dille, Note,
[1959] Juius=NzEr-JNG 489, 490. See also Liideritz, Note, [1959] NEuE JuRissctte
WocsmNscHR-- 1032.
1307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962), reversing 199 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) and 201 F.

Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The New York Court of Appeals had noticed the constitutional question briefly, remarking that certain older Supreme Court decisions in
diversity cases (Northern Pac. R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904)) "do not bring into play the full faith and credit
clause," and citing Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 42, 172 NE.2d 526, 529, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 137-58
(1961).
The Pearson case is noted in 31 FowRHAm L. REv. 196 (1962).
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New York.62 The district court did not discuss the constitutional
question, but gave judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of
$160,150.65, including prejudgment interest of $26,106.88. The
court of appeals reversed in an opinion by Judge Swan, Judge
63
Lumbard concurring. Judge Kaufman dissented.
The holding of the Court of Appeals that Kilberg violates the
Full Faith and Credit Clause64 was rested on Hughes v. Fetter6 5 and
FirstNat'l Bank v. United Air Lines.68 Those cases do not support
the decision. They held only that a state may not arbitrarily close
the doors of its courts to actions for wrongful death occurring in another state. That the forum state is not required to subordinate its
law and policy to that of the state of wrong was explicitly and clearly
stated:
The present case is not one where Wisconsin, having entertained
appellant's lawsuit, chose to apply its own instead of Illinois' statute to
measure the substantive rights involved. This distinguishes the present
case from those where we have said that "Primafacie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted." 67
Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co 68 should have been enough to
eradicate any lingering notion that Hughes and United give any
02See text at notes 13, 14 supra. Prior to Kilberg, Judge Weinfeld had held, on
'the basis of the New York law as it then stood, that the only available recovery was
that allowed by the Massachusetts statute. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 180 F. Supp.
97 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
d3 307 F.2d at 136. The reader will not be surprised to learn that the author of this
paper regards Judge Kaufman's opinion as the enlightened one. Despite its excellence,
the opinion will not be analyzed here in detail, because the argument to be presented
here is so similar. The argument, however, will draw freely upon the opinion.
Judge Kaufman's dissent did not extend to the matter of pre-judgment interest,
which involved only ascertainment of the law of New York.
--341 U.S. 609 (1951).
04 U.S. CoNsr. art. 4, § 1.
de342 U.S. 396 (1952). The court also cited cases on interstate recognition of
divorce decrees to support the proposition that the purpose of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was "to transform an aggregate of independent sovereign states into a
nation." 307 F.2d at 133. Thanks to the act of Congress implementing the clause, 28
U.S.C. § 1738, this is very nearly one nation so far as judgments are concerned: the
judgment of one state must be honored in all others notwithstanding local policies
and interests. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). It is far from being one
nation in the sense that every state must defer to the wrongful death statute of the state
of injury. The Constitution does not incorporate the RESTATEMENT or nrm LAw or
Copriacr or LAws. Congress has not meaningfully implemented the Full Faith and
Credit Clause with respect to public acts. See Currie, The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARV. L. REv. 36, 82 n.162 (1959); Currie, The
Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. Cm. L. Rv.9, 19 (1958).
63 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
07 341 U.S. at 612 n.10.
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such broad scope to the Full Faith and Credit Clause as is claimed
for it in Pearson.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to adopt
any particular set of rules of conflict of laws; it merely sets certain
minimum requirements which each state must observe when asked to
apply the law of a sister state.
The crucial factor in those two cases was that the forum laid an uneven
hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum state.
Causes of action arising in sister states were discriminated against.0 D
The Kilberg case did not lay an uneven hand on the out-of-state
cause of action. The objection raised against that case, paradoxically,
is that it did not discriminate against the foreign cause of action,
but treated it substantially as a domestic case would be treated.
Not only did New York entertain the action, thus avoiding the
discrimination against its own residents that was condemned in
Hughes and United; it went further and applied its own law, as
those cases clearly permit, thus avoiding the infliction of a further
penalty on its own citizens merely because the death occurred outside
the state. My own view is that the justifying principle of Hughes
and United is the equal protection of the laws70 rather than full faith
and credit;7 1 but it is not necessary to accept this proposition to
understand that those cases do not require New York to apply the
law of Massachusetts to measure the substantive rights involved.
Elsewhere I have stated my understanding of the extent to which
the Full Faith and Credit Clause bears upon the choice of law by
state courts.72 The conclusion is simple: The unimplemented clause
requires deference to the law of a sister state only when that state
has an interest in the application of its policy and the forum state
has no such interest; in cases of conflicting interests, such as Kilberg,
the Constitution does not choose between them. Congress has not
exercised its power to determine the choice, and the Court cannot
make the choice without assuming a legislative function of a high
political order.73 The case analysis that supports this conclusion
60
345 U.S. at 516, 518-19.
70 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
7'See Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HARv. L.
Rav. 36, 268 (1959). I do not suggest that, in a case of true conflict such as Kilberg,

New York's refusal to apply its substantive law would be a denial of equal protection,
as it may be in a case of false conflict like Hughes or United.
72 Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9

7"While

(1958).
this view gives limited scope to the unimplemented clause, and while I am
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cannot be repeated here. The following discussion will be limited
to the specific constitutional misconceptions that seem to have produced the unfortunate result in Pearson. Apart from the excessively
broad reading given the Hughes and United cases, the most serious of
these is what I persist in calling the Brandeis fallacy7 4 despite the
fact that attributing fallacious reasoning to a justice so rightly venerated is not a tactic calculated to win friends. Fallacy it is, and
Brandeis is not the only great judge who has nodded when dealing
with the mysteries of the conflict of laws.
The fallacy creeps into the Pearson case when Judge Swan (still
another great judge) accepts the argument of counsel for Northeast
Airlines that there is an "obvious distinction" between Wells and
Pearson:
In Wells the plaintiff was not deprived of all remedy; he could sue in
any state where defendant could be found and which has a longer
statute of limitations than Pennsylvania or follows a different conflicts
rule. In our case defendant had no choice as to the forum. If deprived
of the protection of the limitation imposed by the law which, as Kilberg
recognizes, created the liability, he will.be treated unjustly.
A defendant is in a different position from a plaintiff who seeks to
enforce a cause of action conferred by the laws of another state....75
The opinion then quotes the passage from Mr. Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper that was quoted
in Part I of this discussion.78
There is no denying the seductive appeal of this argument. So
long as one conceives that, on territorial principles, the law of the
state of injury must govern, and therefore is the sole measure of the
rights of the parties, the invocation of local public policy to strike
down a defense under that law must logically be disfavored as a
provincial and recalcitrant refusal to play the game 7 The fallacy
profoundly convinced that the clause has no such function as is claimed for it in
Pearson, I can only regret Professor Ehrenzweig's continued insistence that the clause
has no function at all with respect to the public acts of sister states. See EHMENZWEIG,
CONFuIOr oF LAws passim (1962); cf. Currie, Book Review, 74 HARV. L. REV. 801, 80305 (1960).
U'See the quotation at note 16 supra.
5 307 F.2d at 135.
" See supra note 16.
7Even on the basis of that conception there are arguments against the Brandeis
position, but since they are perhaps arguments in opposition to the dismissal of
foreign-based claims on unsubstantial grounds of local public policy rather than in
support of the application of local law where the defense depends on foreign law.
they will not be emphasized here, but only stated briefly: (1) The plaintiff's claim is
effectively denied if the forum is the only one in which as a practical matter the
7
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appears only when we recognize that the "applicable" law is not in
any exclusive sense that of the state of injury, but may be the law of
New York to the extent that New York interests are involved and
New York is in position to effectuate its interests. The unanimous
Supreme Court did recognize this in the later workmen's compensation cases; and Mr. Justice Brandeis himself must have realized the
infirmities of his former position, for he indicated no dissent from
the opinion of the Court, written by Mr. Justice Stone, in Alaska
PackersAss'n v. Industrial Acc. Comr'n,18 wherein that position was
explicitly rejected:
In the case of statutes, the extra-state effect of which Congress has
not prescribed, where the policy of one state statute comes in conflict
with that of another, the necessity of some accommodation of the conflicting interests of the tvo states is still more apparent. A rigid and
literal enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard
to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever
the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts
of the other, but cannot be in its own. Unless by force of that clause a
greater effect is thus to be given to a statute abroad than the clause
permits it to have at home, it is unavoidable that this Court determine
for itself the extent to which the statute of one state may qualify or
deny rights asserted under the statute of another....
The necessity is not any the less whether the statute and policy of
the forum is set up as a defense to a suit brought under the foreign
statute or the foreign statute is set up as a defense to a suit or proceedings
under the local statute. In either case, the conflict is the same. In each,
rights claimed under one statute prevail only by denying effect to the
other. In both the conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic
effect to the full faith and credit clause, compelling the courts of each
state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other, but by
appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning
the scale of decision according to their weight.70
plaintiff can sue, and the range of his choice is limited not only by jurisdictional rules
but by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In the Wells case itself it may be that
the plaintiff could sue only in Pennsylvania. (2) It is not always easy to determine
whether the dismissal is on grounds of local public policy or on the merits; if it
purports to be on the merits, the plaintiff's freedom to proceed elsewhere is obstructed. (3) In a constitutional system commanding full faith and credit to the
laws of sister states, the concept of an "applicable" law that nevertheless need not be
applied if it is distasteful to the forum is a contradiction in terms unless the forum
has a legitimate interest in the application of its own law and policy. For a fuller
discussion see Carrie, supra note 72, at 28-29.
" 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
7Id. at 547. The Court retreated perceptibly from the position that it must
"weigh" and choose between the conflicting interests in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939). See Currie, supra note 72, at 22.
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In Alaska Packers the Court sustained the disallowance of a
defense based on the assertedly "applicable" foreign law. It did
so again in PacificEmployers Ins. Co. v. IndustrialAcc. Comm'n;80
it did so again in Carroll v. Lanza;8 ' it did so again, in substance, in
Griffin v. McCoach; 2 it did so again in Watson v. Employers Liability Ins. Corp.,s -witha crystal-dear statement of governmental-interest
analysis.8 4 All this should have effectively disposed of the Brandeis
position; but it is not alone truth that, crushed to earth, will rise
again.
It is not entirely clear what the court of appeals would have said
if New York had simply declared, on the authority of these cases,
that New York had an interest in the application of its policy and
that the plaintiff could recover on the New York statute without
reference to the Massachusetts statute. The broad interpretation of
the Hughes and United cases seems to indicate that such an approach
would have made no difference. Concerning the powerful authority
of Alaska Packers and PacificEmployers and the inroads there made
on the authority of Clapper,the court said only: "In our opinion the
workmen's compensation cases are distinguishable."8 5 But the New
York Court of Appeals, instead of holding its statute applicable, had
taken pains to emphasize that the plaintiff must proceed under the
Massachusetts statute, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit seized on this fact as if it made a critical difference. "[N]othing
in the later [workmen's compensation] cases gives support to the
proposition that full faith and credit must give way to a local policy
not embodied in a statute which directly governs the cause of
action."8 60 Mr. Justice Stone's interment of the Brandeis fallacy was
80Supra note 79.
8 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
82313 U.S. 498 (1941) (an interpleader case).

83 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
84 Cf. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). where the Court
gave its approval to the forum's application of its own law and policy to deny a part
of the claim asserted by the plaintiff under the "applicable" foreign law, thus in all
probability precluding the plaintiff from asserting that part of the claim elsewhere.
ar 307 F.2d at 136. Ifthis means that the governmental-interest analysis is restricted
to such "economic and social" legislation as workmen's compensation, and is inapplicable to "juridical" questions, Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination
in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323, 1354 (1960), it
is certainly unsound.

Cf. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962), the significance

of which was apparently lost on the court of appeals. 307 F2d at 136. Mr. Justice
Stone's Alaska Packers distinction between tort and workmen's compensation was a
device to escape territorialist precedents that would hardly be required today as it was
in 1935. See 307 F.2d at 136 n. 7; cf. Currie, supra note 72, at 66.
36 307 F.2d at 136.

(Emphasis supplied.)
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not quoted; but the court seems to be saying that Stone's language

must be given the narrowest possible construction: "The necessity is
not any the less whether the statute and policy of the forum is set up
as a defense to a suit brought under the foreign statute or the foreign
statute is set up as a defense to a suit or proceedings under the local
statute" 87 In Pearson the action is not under the local statute, but
under the foreign statute, so the argument seems to go; hence the
principle stated by Stone does not apply; it applies only where the
local policy is "embodied in a statute which directly governs the
cause of action."
But such an attempt to retrieve a fragment of the demolished
Brandeis fallacy borders on the absurd. Stone was surely stating
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not forbid a state to
apply its own law to effectuate its own policy where it has a legitimate interest in so doing, irrespective of whether the local law and
policy are used defensively or as a ground for recovery. So far, at
least, as the principal issue of limitation of liability is concerned, it
makes no practical difference whatever whether the New York court

says that the plaintiff in Kilberg is suing under the New York statute
or the Massachusetts statute; and surely a state court does not violate
the Constitution when it reaches a perfectly sound result but uses
language that gives offense to doctrinal purists.85
There is one respect in which the outcome of the Pearson case is
affected by the circumstance that New York held the Massachusetts
statute "applicable" instead of applying its own. The New York
statute provides for pre-judgment interest; but in Davenport v.
Webb 9 the Court of Appeals of New York refused to apply that
provision where the death occurred in Maryland, whose law did not
allow such interest. Accordingly, the court of appeals disallowed
such interest in Pearson. More than a vestige of territorialism lurks
in Davenport,and this circumstance troubles some students, at least;
it seems to lend plausibility to the Brandeis fallacy as revived by the
court of appeals in Pearson. But surely if the right of New York
1 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). (Emsupplied.)
phasis
8
1 "So even if the state court had rested its conclusions on an improper ground, this
Court could not, in view of the undisputed facts establishing its validity, declare a
solemn act of the State of New Jersey unconstitutional." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on-Drugs,
Inc., 366 U.S. 276, 284 (1961) (per Black, J.).
8' 11 N.Y.2d 892, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
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to apply its own wrongful death statute in its entirety is established,

as it almost certainly is, then New York has the right to apply less
than all of its law on the subject of wrongful death. No principle

requires a state to define its interests in the broadest terms possible
under the Constitution. Kilberg was a case in which the interests
of New York were in conflict with those of Massachusetts. New York
is entitled to apply its own policy whenever its relationship to the
case is such as to make the application of that law a reasonable
ordering of its own concerns. It need not, however, ignore the
competing interests of Massachusetts and other restraining considerations; in defining the situations in which legislative policy requires
that domestic law be applied, it need not be egoeentric and provincial
but may proceed with enlightenment and restraint in an attempt
to achieve an accommodation of interests. Davenportv. Webb may
be interpreted as a determination by New York not to assert an
interest in applying its policy concerning pre-judgment interest,
even though it might constitutionally assert such an interest.90 This
may not seem entirely consistent with New York's policy of requiring
full indemnity for the death of its citizens, since by New York
standards interest from the date of death is requisite to full indemnity; but the decision in no way impairs the validity of the
holding in Kilberg that New York has an interest in preventing
the obstruction of that policy by the application of arbitrary limitations on the amount recoverable. The New York policy so far as
limitations are concerned was long-established and fundamental; the
New York court regarded the policy concerning pre-judgment interest as less urgent, for reasons satisfactory to itself-including what
the court conceived to be practical reasons affecting the interests of
New York litigants caught in the coils of the conflicts system.91
,1"Whether we now refuse to apply our prejudgment interest statute because, as we
said in the Murmann case, 'The Legislature had no intention to make it reach so far,
... or whether we refuse to do so because our statutory provision authorizing the addition of such interest... 'constitute[s] a part of the substantive law of the state'.., the
meaning and effect are the same." II N.Y.2d at 894, 183 N.E.2d at 904, 230 N.Y.S.2d at
19.
" Id. at 9, 183 N.Ed at 904, 230 N.Y.S. at 20.
Perhaps what troubles the critics is fear that the forum, by adhering to the law of
the place of the wrong while reserving the right to reject distasteful provisions of that
law, might pick and choose in such a way as to secure for the local plaintiff the benefit
of provisions of the foreign law more favorable than the domestic law, while rejecting
the less favorable. Suppose, for example, that the laws of New York and Massachusetts
were the reverse of what they are on the question of pre-judgment interest: i.e., that
Massachusetts provides for such interest while New York does not. Might not New
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The court was simply acting with restraint in defining domestic
interests, insisting on the application of New York law only where
the adverse effect of foreign law on New York's affairs is very severe,
and asserting no interest in opposition to that of other interested
states in matters of lesser import.
An excellent illustration of this kind of analysis is Bernkrant v.
Fowler,9 2 where Mr. Justice Traynor declared:
We have no doubt that California's interest in protecting estates being
probated here from false claims based on.alleged oral contracts to make
wills is constitutionally sufficient to justify the Legislature's making our
statute of frauds applicable to all such contracts sought to be enforced
against such estates.93
tut, having said this, Mr. Justice Traynor proceeded to define California's interest with moderation and restraint, and with due regard
to the interest of the sister state of Arizona in the enforcement of
the contract, reaching the result that in the circumstances California
policy did not require application of the California statute; there
was no conflict. That is the result in Pearsonso far as pre-judgment
interest is concerned; but when it comes to the question of full
indemnity versus the arbitary limitation of liability, New York has
legitimately asserted an interest in conflict with that of Massachusetts, and nothing in the Constitution requires that New York's
interest be subordinated.
Some commentators on the Kilberg decision have expressed
concern over the fact that, if New York's interest is based upon its
concern for New York people, as indeed it is, the victims of a single
:accident will be treated differently according to the laws of their
home states. Let us confront this problem squarely, even dramatize
it. In its early stages, the Pearson case was consolidated for trial
w;vith another wrongful death action arising out of the same accident:
York, on the basis of the place-of-wrong rule, allow pre-judgment interest while rejecting the $15,000 limitation? To do so would be indefensible from the standpoint
of governmental-interest analysis. In order to have an interest a state must first have
a policy, and New York (on our assumption here) has no policy of awarding prejudgment interest to its injured citizens. In the actual case there was no question
of giving the plaintiff any benefit not provided by New York law. Horrible hypotheticals such as the one suggested above are simply the product of of the New York
court's transitional compromise, paying lip-service to the traditional rule while moving
in the direction of governmental-interest analysis.
92 55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
13Id. at 594, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 269, 860 P.2d at 909.
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Trauth v. Northeast Airlines."- The deceased and his surviving
dependents were residents of New Jersey. A single judge-Judge
McGohey-had the responsibility of deciding both cases. As we
know, he held that in Pearson he was required to follow Kilberg
and disregard the Massachusetts limitation. But when the plaintiff
in Trauth moved for leave to amend her complaint to allege damages in excess of $15,000, he ruled that the motion must be denied,
because he found no indication that New Jersey would do otherwise
than apply the law of the state of injury. This ruling, contended
counsel for Mrs. Trauth, was a denial of the equal protection of the
laws . 5
Rather clearly, it was nothing of the sort. Of course, if New
York were to reserve the benefit of its unlimited recovery exclusively
for New York citizens, or domiciliaries, or residents, even when the
defendant is a New York citizen and the injury and death occur in
New York, that would be a denial of equal protection.9 6 But where
New York has no interest in applying its protective policy because
the deceased and his dependents are nonresidents, except perhaps
an altruistic interest in treating all persons alike, and where the
state of domicile of the deceased and his dependents has not asserted
an interest in their protection, 7 the application of New York law
would probably be a denial of Lull faith and credit to the law of the
only state having an interest in the matter: Massachusetts.98
It is a natural reaction to flinch when two parties, apparently so
similarly situated, are differently treated; and the reaction is heightened by the juxtaposition of the two cases in the same court at the
*9Civil No. 149-256, S.D.N.Y.

The author is indebted to Frank G. Sterritte, Esquire,

counsel for the plaintiff in Pearson, for information concerning the Trauth case,
including a portion of the transcript and a copy of the brief filed by Speiser, Quinn &
O'Brien, attorneys for Mrs. Trauth.
'1 Matters did not reach the stage where it would have been necessary to instruct
a single jury to observe the Massachusetts limitation in Trauth but not in Pearson.
Court and counsel were agreed that the ruling would necessitate a severance; in the
end the trial of both cases in the same court was avoided by a settlement of the
Trauth case.
go Even in such a case, New York might reasonably classify nonresidents according
to the laws of their home states. See Currie 9- Schreter, UnconstitutionalDiscrimination7 in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection,28 U. CHt. L. REV. 1, 29-42 (1960).
9 While the New Jersey wrongful death statute, like New York's, provides without
limitation for damages that are fair and just with reference to the pecuniary injuries
Tesulting from death, N.J. STATS. ANN. § 2A:31-5 (1952), Judge McGohey found that
New Jersey would apply the Massachusetts statute.
"See Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws:
Privilegesand Immunities, 69 YArx L.J. 1323, 1366, 1368 (1960).
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same time. But on closer examination it is clear that there is a
significant difference between the situations of these parties: Mr.
Trauth was a citizen of a state less solicitous for the welfare of its
citizens than New York was for the welfare of Mr. Pearson and its
other citizens. If Mrs. Trauth had sued in her home state of New
Jersey, the disparity of treatment would perhaps pass unnoticed.
Why should New York attempt to give Mr. Trauth's dependents
what New Jersey withholds from them? It can hardly come as a
surprise to students of the conflict of laws that differences of domicile
sometimes lead to differential treatment of parties. It could easily
happen that a single New York court, having before it substantially
identical wills, might hold one valid because the testator was domidled in New York, and the other invalid because the testator was
domiciled in Massachusetts,9 9 the two states having different laws. 100
The Trauth case is one in which classification according to domicile

is not only permissible but mandatory if New York is to avoid
unjustified encroachment on Massachusetts' interest. 101
The really difficult case would have been presented if Judge
McGohey had found that New Jersey, like New York, had asserted
an interest in securing full indemnity for its citizens injured outside
the state. There would then be a direct conflict between the interests of New Jersey and Massachusetts; but New York would still
have no interest *inthe matter-except, again, its altruistic interest
0'"The validity and effect of a will of movables is determined by the law of the
RESTATEMENT, CoNFUCr OF LAWS § 306

state in which the deceased died domiciled."
(1934).
100

"But the [Privileges and Immunities] clause has nothing to do with the dis-

tinctions
founded on domicile." Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562, 608 (1860).
01
2 This is not to say, of course, that a choice-of-law rule referring to domicile
should be substituted for the one referring to the place of wrong. What is defended
in the text is not a choice-of-law rule at all, in the sense that all states are expected
to follow it. The suggestion is that each state is free, and well-advised, to apply its own
law for the effectuation of its own policy when it has a legitimate interest in so doing.
Massachusetts, for example, would be expected to apply its own law in these cases
for the protection of the Massachusetts enterprise; and counsel for the airline would
no doubt argue for that result had the plane crashed in New York and the action
been filed in Massachusetts. This is what New York did in the days when it limited
liability for wrongful death. In Wooden v. Western N.Y. & Pa. ILR., 126 N.Y. 10,
26 N.E. 1050 (1891), a case heavily relied on in .ilberg, the injury occurred in Pennsyl.
vania, whose statute contained no limitation; the New York statute at the time did
contain a limitation; the New York court applied his own statute on the ground that it
pertained "to the remedy, rather than the right," but made it reasonably clear that
it was applying New York policy for the benefit of the New York enterprises for which
it was designed-the defendant being a New York corporation.
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in treating all persons alike. Possibly that interest would be
sufficient to justify application of New York law, though it would

seem clearly insufficient if it were in conflict with the interest of
Massachusetts alone. Aside from that possibility, the situation
presents once again the intractable problem of the disinterested third
state. Concerning that problem I have in the past made some rather
facetious remarks.10 2 To a degree the jesting has been in earnest;
yet I appreciate the fact that in some areas of the law, at least, where
the disinterested forum has no alternative but to adjudicate the
case, there are better solutions than for the court simply to apply
the law of the forum by default, and that these solutions can be
defended on some rational basis even though the disinterested
forum is hardly in position to make a deliberate choice between the
competing governmental interests of the other states involved. Indeed, I am inclined to believe that it was in this kind of case, where
the forum had no interest in the matter but had to decide the case
somehow, that rules for choice of law originated, and that it was
only at some late stage of their development that the conceptual
justifications for them burst the bounds of the problem and began to
subvert the interests of the forum state itself. But this is a matter for
future consideration. So far as our hypothetical variant of the Trauth
case is concerned, although it is possible that a better solution could
be found in some rather arbitrary choice-of-law rule, I repeat, notwithstanding criticism that I greatly respect, 03 that New York's application of its own law would not be unconstitutional, simply because
no one can show that the presumptively applicable law of the forum
should be displaced by any particularforeign law. If, instead, New
York elects to choose between the competing foreign laws, any rule
it adopts for that purpose should be judged by its pragmatic values
alone; "the Constitution and the first principles of legal thinking" 0.1' have nothing to do with it.
102

See Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258, 279 (1961).
103 See Schreter, "Quasi-Community Property" in the Conflict of Laws, 50 CAar. L.
RaV. 206, 233 n.172 (1962); M. Traynor. Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie'sRestrained
and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALF. L R.v. 845, 863 (1961); Hill, GovernmentalInterest
and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. Cm. L. Pv. 463, 478
(1960).
10, Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 214 (1922) (per Holmes, 3.).
(Editor'sNote: For the most recent development in the Pearson case, see Epilogue,
p. 53 infra.].
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III
GUEST STATUTES-BABCOCK

If New York is solicitous for the welfare of its citizens killed in
aircraft accidents outside the state, it is singularly callous concerning
the welfare of its citizens injured outside the state while guests in
motor vehicles. In Babcock v. Jackson'05 the plaintiff and the defendant,1 0 6 both residents of Rochester, New York, set out from
Rochester on a trip that took them into the Canadian province
of Ontario, the plaintiff being a guest in the defendant's automobile.
In Ontario the car went out of control and collided with a stone
wall, seriously injuring the plaintiff. When she sued in New York
the defendant pleaded the Ontario guest statute, a Draconian provision without parallel in any of the United States:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1, the owner or driver of
a motor vehicle, other than a vehicle operated in the business of carrying
passengers for compensation, shall not be liable for any loss or damage
resulting from bodily injury to, or the death of, any person being carried
in, or upon, or entering or getting into, or alighting from such motor
vehicle.107
Special Term granted a motion to dismiss the action. The Appellate
Division affirmed without opinion. Only a fervent dissent by Mr.
Justice Halpern prevented this remarkable decision from passing
into oblivion.
Mr. Justice Halpern provided at least five distinct bases on which
a different result might be rested:
I. The precedent of Kilberg, with its emphasis on the strong
policy of New York and that state's interest in applying its compensatory policy for the protection of its own injured residents.
"The New York Legislature has repeatedly refused to enact a statute
denying or limiting the right of a guest to recover from his
host...." 0 8
2. The "center of gravity" theory, or the concept that the applicable law is that of the state having "the most significant contacts" with the case. This theory, applied to a contract case by the
'Or 230 N.Y.S.2d 114 (App. Div. 1962).
20OThe action was brought against the executor of the deceased driver, but for
convenience the opinion of Mr. Justice Halpern refers to the defendant's testator as
here.
the defendant, and that practice will be followed
108
230 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
107230 N.YS.2d at 115-16.
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New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten,10 9 was capable of
being extended to tort cases. 10
3. Characterization of the problem as one of contract, or of the
relationship of host and guest, thus permitting application of New
York law on the authority of Dyke v. Erie Ry.Un
4. A choice-of-law rule on the English model, whereby the foreign tort is actionable if actionable by the law of the forum and not
justifiable by the law of the place of the wrong. The negligence of
the defendant was a punishable oftense by the law of Ontario. By
resort to the English rule, Ontario's sister province of Quebec had
avoided application of the Ontario guest statute when one of its
residents was injured by another in Ontario.22
5. The doctrine of renvoi: i.e., that the rule that the law of the
place of injury governs is a reference to the whole law of that state,
including its choice-of-law rules. Investigation might reveal that
Ontario itself would not apply its statute to an accident involving
only nonresidents.
These various approaches, I feel obliged to note, vary a great
deal in their soundness." 3 Whatever merit the renvoi approach may
have in some circumstances, its application here would give the
result into the keeping of the Ontario courts, where it distinctly does
not belong. Had the case been decided on this ground, the result
would have been in doubt until such time as the trial court, on
remand, had inquired into the Ontario choice-of-law rule. Even
then, the result of the inquiry might be inconclusive. Worst of all,
the result might have been a finding that Ontario would apply its
statute notwithstanding. New York's interest being clear, to let the
result depend on Ontario's views on the conflict of laws would be
sheer abdication.
The English rule, while yielding an acceptable result in the
case before the court, is not a sharp tool for treating tort problems
308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E2d 99 (1954).
Judge Fuld, author of the opinion in Auten, felt foreclosed by
precedent from applying this test in Kilberg. See note 8 supra.
11145 N.Y. 113 (1871). Since .Babcoct was not an action for wrongful death, the
obstacle to this characterization encountered in Kilberg was not present.
212 McLean v. Pettigrew, [1945] 2 DJ..R. 65, cited in 230 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
213 I do so in no spirit of criticism of Mr. Jutice Halpern; he was fighting with all
available weapons to avoid an irrational and unjust result, and had to contend with
a court of appeals that is by no means dear as to its methods and objectives in the
field of conflict of laws.
100

110However,
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generally in the conflict of laws. Ingenious characterization merely
suppresses the real reasons for the decision. With the "center of
gravity" theory we shall have to deal in Part IV; to avoid repetition,
let us observe here only that there is no assurance that a court,
starting from a territoralist bias and placing a premium on uniformity, might not assess the "territorial contacts" and the "domiciliar contacts" and conclude that Ontario has the most significant
14
"contacts" with the case."

It is Mr. Justice Halpern's analysis of governmental interests
that gives conviction to his dissenting opinion. New York's policy

of requiring the tortfeasor to compensate the guest is clear; its interest in applying that law for the benefit of the injured New York
resident is equally clear. On the other hand, Ontario has no interest
at all in the application of its guest statute. Again we must beware
of overgeneralized statements concerning the interest of the state of
injury. That state normally has an interest in the application of
certain of its policies: e.g., its policy of deterring hazardous conduct,
or of protecting local medical creditors. But we are here concerned
with a specific policy, expressed in the guest statute, that has nothing
to do with promoting safety nor with securing reimbursement to
local Samaritans. The guest statute expresses a policy for the protection of defendants. The defendant here, however, is not a citizen
or resident of Ontario; he is a citizen of a state that holds him
accountable for injuries to his guests.
It is probably more accurate to label the Ontario policy one for
the protection of automobile liability insurers. "[Guest statutes]
have been the result of persistent lobbying on the part of liability
insurance companies.""115
Halpern:

This was recognized by Mr. Justice

The primary purpose of the Ontario statute was stated by an academic
commentator, shortly after its enactment, as follows: "Undoubtedly, the
object of the provision is to prevent the fraudulent assertion of claims
by passengers, in collusion with the drivers, against insurance companies.""16
But this restatement of the policy does not affect the conclusion that
Ontario has no interest in its application in the Babcock situation.
1
11
118

Cf.text at note 50 supra.
PRossn_ & Srmn, CASES ON TORws 215 (3d ed. 1962).
230 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
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Mr. Justice Halpern correctly stated that "In the light of this purpose, it is apparent that-the interest of Ontario in the enforcement
of its legislative policy is limited to accidents involving Ontario residents [as defendants]." 117 Automobile liability insurance rates
are based upon loss experience in artificially defined territories.
It is important to keep in mind that these territories are aggregates
of assureds, not aggregates of claimants or accidents. Thus, a clairi
against an entrepreneur is allocated to his territory even if the accident
giving rise to the claim was outside the territory, the claimant resided
outside the territory, or suit was brought in a remote jurisdiction."s
A judgment against Jackson for the injuries suffered by his guest in
Ontario would not affect insurance rates in Ontario. If this were
not so, we should have to concede Ontario an interest in the application of its law, and it could be said of the Babcock decision that,
though it subverts the interest of New York, it furthers the interest
of the foreign state. As matters stand, however, it can only be said
that the decision subverts the interest of New York without advancing the interest of any state. 1 9
l%71bid.

I'sMorris, Enterprise Liabilty and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of
Foresight, 70 YAix L.J. 554, 565 (1961). Normally the assured's territory is that in
which he resides. If in certain special cases it is instead the territory in which the
automobile is habitually garaged, that fact can give no comfort to proponents of the
strange concept that the applicable law (as to liability to guests) should be that of
the place where the automobile is garaged. See EHnVNZWEIG, CONELMCT or LAws 518
(1962). Actuarially that proposal is demolished by Morris, supra, at 574-576. That
it would poorly effectuate the interests of the affected states is obvious.
119 In an effort to distinguish the troublesome case of Davenport v. Webb, 11
N.Y.2d 292, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962) (holding that the law of the state
of injury governs as to the allowability of prejudgment interest), Mr. Justice Halpern
took what I regard as a too restricted view of New York's interests. In Davenport New
York residents were killed in Maryland in a collision between the car in which they
were traveling and a truck owned and operated by Virginians. "The only connection
of New York State with the case was that the decedents were residents of the state.
In that situation, there was no basis for a claim that New York State had a dominant
interest in the case. The Maryland law would therefore have been applicable even
under the 'proper law of the tort' approach." 280 N.Y.S.2d at 121. This illustrates
well the weakness of all such approaches, including the "center of gravity" and the
"grouping of contacts." New York's concern for the welfare of its own citizens is not
diminished when they are injured by nonresidents rather than by fellow New Yorkers.
The significance of the fact that the defendant is a nonresident is simply that because
of that fact another state may have an interest in the application of its law. (We
cannot digress here to consider the bearing of the fact that in Davenport v. Webb the
defendants were Virginians rather than residents of Maryland, the forum state.) New
York may choose to defer to that interest by not asserting a conflicting one, as it did
in Davenport, but New York cannot wisely decide that it will routinely defer to the
interests of the defendant's state. Thus if the defendant in Babcock had been a
resident of Ontario, it would not automatically follow that Ontario law should be
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This being so, it is difficult to understand how the four other
Appellate Division justices turned a deaf ear to Mr. Justice Halpem's
argument. Territorialist dogma can have a hypnotic effect, but it
is difficult to believe that in this sophisticated age that effect alone
can account for such a phenomenon. Presumably these justices, like
the law-review commentators on Kilberg, have committed themselves
to the ideals of simplicity and uniformity as near absolutes, to be
secured at almost any cost. It is difficult to reason against such convictions. It apparently does little good to point out that simplicity
and uniformity come too high when the effect on state policies and
interests is totally disregarded. Possibly it may help a little to repeat
that a case such as Babcock does not really raise a problem in the
conflict of laws at all A conflicts problem does not arise merely
because a statement of the facts of the case requires mention of two
states. A true problem arises only when the laws of two or more
states are in conflict, in the sense that each state has an interest in
the application of its distinctive legal policy. It was presumably for
such cases that choice-of-law rules were devised. Such rules do not
serve well in the solution of true problems; they are utterly indefensible when, in application to false problems, they simply subvert the interest of the only interested state. If it is uniformity we
want, let it be achieved in cases of the Babcock type by appealing to
all states to apply the law of the only interested state: New York.
At some time in the future it may come to be recognized that in
this decision New York has denied to the plaintiff, Babcock, the
equal protection of its laws. I do not expect a decision to that
effect in the near future. So deeply have we been indoctrinated by
territorialist notions that a court would have to be not only perceptive but quite bold in order to declare that the occurrence of the
injury in Ontario was not a reasonable basis for classification.
Similarly, the commitment to uniformity at any price is so general
that even I would hesitate to deny a state the right to pursue that
goal by any device it may choose. Yet I would not hesitate for long
in such a case as this. If Ontario had the slightest interest in the
matter, the classification could be justified by deference to that
applied. Ontario would have an interest in the application of its guest statute for
the protection of the defendant. But New York's interest in the application of its
own law would remain-if New York chose to assert it; and no "proper law" or
"center of gravity" theory can demonstrate that New York's interest is inferior.
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interest; but when there is no conceivable Ontario interest, and
when uniformity could easily be obtained if all states would recognize New York's interest, to deny a New York resident the protection
of New York law simply because the accident happened in Ontario
is arbitrary and irrational. The United States Supreme Court has
already held that a state may not arbitrarily close its courts to its
residents injured abroad; 120 it may some day hold that a state may
not arbitrarily deny its residents the benefit of its laws merely because they were injured abroad.ul
IV
CHILD SUPPORT: HAAG

It is painful. for me to take issue with anyone who, sharing the
widespread disillusionment with the traditional system of conflict of
laws, is diligently seeking new methods of analysis. It is especially
painful to take issue with those who would abjure the talismanic
single "contact" of the traditional rule and inquire into the significance of the various ways in which a state is related to the case,
since this is certainly a step in what I conceive to be the right direction. But it is precisely because there is some superficial resemblance
between the "grouping of contacts" theory and the method of
governmental-interest analysis that I feel called upon to emphasize
the differences between the two methods, and to use strong language
in pointing out what seem to me the deficiencies of the "grouping of
contacts" approach.
Governmental-interest analysis is, of course, concerned with the
ways in which the respective states are related to the parties, the
events, and the litigation; it is impossible even to define a problem in
the conflict of laws without taking account of such relationships.
Governmental-interest analysis is also concerned with the significance
of those relationships. But here the resemblance ends. The "grouping of contacts" theory provides no standard for determining what
"contacts" are significant, nor for appraising the relative significance
of the respective groups of "contacts." Governmental-interest analy" Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951).

12' Similarly, the decision may be regarded as a denial of due process by analogy to

Homes Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). If a state denies due process by applying
its own law when it has no interest in doing so, it does so equally when it applies
the law of a foreign state having no interest in the application of its law.
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sis determines the relevance of the relationship by inquiring whether
it furnishes a reasonable basis for the state's assertion of an interest
in applying the policy embodied in its law. Its methodology-while
no one would claim for it ease of application, or complete objectivity,
or more precision than we ordinarily find in legal reasoning-is at
least the familiar one of construction and interpretation. That methodology permits, and requires, a statement of the reasons why a state's
relationship to the case is thought to be significant. The statement
is sufficiently objective to be susceptible of objective criticism. It is
explicitly an attempt to determine legislative purpose, and if that
purpose is misinterpreted, legislative correction is invited. The
process of "grouping contacts" has none of these features. It deals
in broad generalities about the "interest" of a state in applying its
law without inquiry into how the "contacts" in question relate to the
policies expressed in specific laws. One "contact" seems to be about
as good as another for almost any purpose. The "contacts" are
totted up and a highly subjective fiat is issued to the effect that one
group of contacts or the other is the more significant. The reasons
for the conclusion are too elusive for objective evaluation. State
interests are quite likely to be thwarted in the confusion. The pronouncement that the "contacts" with State X are the more significant has a mystical sound, as if the supreme authority had pronounced the true Nature of Things. Like the older pronouncement
that the law of the place of injury, or of contracting, must govern,
this must have a tendency to inhibit legislative intervention. As of
old, the impression given is that it is the business of legislatures to
make laws for domestic consumption; it is the task of the courts to
determine how those laws operate in cases involviing other states.
How can the legislature change the "center of gravity"? Can it
change the value of r?
We have already seen, in the law-review criticisms of Kilberg,
how poorly governmental interests can fare in the calculus of "contacts." Haag v. Barnes-2 2 is another case in point. It provides an
excellent specimen for laboratory analysis of the "grouping of
contacts" theory in comparison with the analysis of governmental
122 9 N.Y2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d

65 (1961).

See Ehrenzweig, The

"Bastard" in the Conflict of Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 498
(1962).
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interests, for here we see the former method applied by the hands
of its prime judicial advocate.
Norman Barnes was a resident of Illinois who on occasion
traveled to New York on business. On such an occasion in 1954,
having need of secretarial services, he employed Dorothy Haag, a
resident of New York, through a local agency. The employment
relationship evolved into one of friendship and then of intimacy,
with the alleged result that Dorothy became pregnant. After an
interval during which she visited her sister in California, she went
to Chicago to see Barnes and succeeded only in seeing his attorney,
who advised her to go to a Chicago hospital, where the child was
born. Apparently she then returned to New York, where she was
still unable to see Barnes. At the request of his attorney she went
again to Chicago, employed an attorney there, and there signed an
agreement for the child's support. The agreement recited payments
already made; Barnes promised to pay $275 a month until the child
should attain the age of sixteen; Barnes was released from all further
obligation; and the parties agreed that their contract should "in all
respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the
State of Illinois."'=
Dorothy agreed to remain with the child in Illinois for two years,
but apparently this was not done; in accordance with a provision
of the contract, she secured Barnes's consent to go to California
instead. After two years, she returned to New York with the child.
About a year later she instituted a support proceeding'against Barnes,
in which he pleaded the Illinois agreement as a complete defense.
Under the law of Illinois "such father may compromise all his legal
liability on account of such bastard child, with the mother thereof,
without the written consent of such judge, by paying to her any
sum not less than eight hundred dollars."' 24 Under New York law,
"An agreement or compromise made by the mother.., shall be
binding only when the court shall have determined that adequate
provision has been made."' 25 The court of special sessions dismissed
the complaint; the appellate division 26 and the court of appeals
affirmed.2 7
123 9

N.Y.2d at 558, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 67.
112See 11 App. Div. 2d at 483, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
12r, See 9 N.Y.2d at 58-59, 175 N.F2d to 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
'

1 App. Div. 2d 430, 207 N.Y.2d 624 (1960).
9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
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There was reason enough for this judicial unanimity. The settlement appeared to be a generous one. The New York courts obviously thought that it made more than "adequate provision" for the
child's support. In these circumstances the requirement of judicial
approval at the time the contract was made may well have seemed
"a mere formality,"' 28 and the absence of such approval a technical
defect curable nunc pro tunc by a finding of adequacy in the pending
proceeding. If the court had said this and nothing more, the case
would have been noncontroversially disposed of; in this light, there
was simply no conflict between Illinois and New York. In the end
the court of appeals said substantially as much ("[]e must conclude
that the 'welfare of the child' is full protected"). 29 Before saying
this, however, the court of appeals spread upon the pages of the
New York Reports, from which it can never be eradicated, a disquisition on the conflict of laws that presumably is to control the
decision of other cases in the future-some of them, perhaps, cases
in which the provision made by the father is less generous.
Putting aside the "traditional view" that the law governing a
contract is to be determined by the intention of the parties, Judge
Fuld said:
The more modern view is that "the courts, instead of regarding as
conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making or performance,
lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place 'which has the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute.'"

. . . Whichever of

these views one applies in this case, however, the answer is the same,
namely, that Illinois law applies.
The agreement, in so many words, recites that it "shall in all respects
be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the State of
Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by the complainant in
Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these
factors as conclusive and result in applying Illinois law. But, even if the
parties' intention and the place of making of the contract are not given
decisive effect, they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining which jurisdiction "has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute."

. . . And, when these important factors are taken

together, with other of the "significant contacts" in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts are the
following: (1) both parties are designated in the agreement as being
"of Chicago, Illinois," and the defendant's place of business is and always
128

11 App. Div. 2d at 434, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 628.

221 9 N.Y.2d at 561, 175 N.E2d at 444, 216 N.Y.S.Rd at 70.
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has been in Illinois; (2) the child was born in Illinois; (3) the persons
designated to act as agents for the principals (except for a third alternate)
are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew the
agreement; and (4) all contributions for support always have been, and
still are being, made from Chicago.

Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York contacts are
of far less weight and significance. Chief among these is the fact that
child and mother presently live in New York and that part of the
"liaison" took place in New York. When these contacts are measured
against the parties' dearly expressed intention to have their agreement
governed by Illinois law and the more numerous and more substantial
Illinois contacts, it may not be gainsaid that the "center of gravity" of
this agreement is Illinois and that, absent compelling public policy
to the contrary... Illinois law should apply.130
I find disturbing this indiscriminate accumulation of "contacts"
without reference to any standard. I also find disturbing the
conclusion that "it may not be gainsaid" that the "center of gravity"
is Illinois, with its implication that not even the legislature can
change the result. This is not the way of governmental-interest
analysis. That method inquires first of all into the policies expressed
in the respective laws. The court of appeals did inquire into the
purpose of the New York statute, though at the end rather than at
the beginning of its opinion. As a result we know that the policy
of that statute is primarily to secure the welfare of the child, and
ultimately to protect the community against the contingency of the
child's becoming a public charge. The policy of Illinois was apparently to prefer freedom of contract over restrictions designed to
safeguard the child and the community, to encourage out-of-court
settlement of support claims, and to enable the unfortunate father
to escape a continuing burden of support by the payment of a modest
price, if his bargaining power should be sufficient. This is not a
particularly humane or prudent policy, and it has since been
abandoned by Illinois; but neither of those matters is our concern
here.'

31

The next step is to determine the circumstances in which the
respective statutes must be applied in order to effectuate the policies
22OId. at 559-60, 175 N.E.2d at 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69.
21 Cf. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), in which the court questionably
allowed a change of law subsequent to the transaction to affect its decision as to the
"policy" of the forum state.
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declared in the statutes. For the New York court the problem concerns primarily the New York statute; but let us dispose first, and
somewhat summarily, of the problem from the standpoint of the
Illinois courts. Conceivably they might give a restrained and
moderate interpretation to the Illinois statute, finding that it was not
intended to apply where the mother is a resident of another state.
Let us assume, however, that they will give it a fairly broad, though
still reasonable, interpretation, holding it applicable whenever the
father is a citizen or resident of Illinois.
Turning to the New York statute, we find the problem complicated by a degree of uncertainty as to an important fact. In general
the case is treated by the courts on the basis that Dorothy was at all
relevant times a resident of New York. As the dissenting justices
in the appellate division noted, however, the record was unsatisfactory as to her sojourns in California before and after the birth of
the child.13 2 Instead of affirming a summary dismissal, they would
have remanded the case for a hearing and finding on Dorothy's
residence at the time of the .making of the contract. The fact that
this course was not followed suggests that the majority of the appellate division, and the court of appeals, felt that the result would
not be changed even though all doubt that she was a resident of
New York at that time were dispelled. The complaint alleged that
she had been a resident of New York since 1947. A fair inference
would seem to be that while in California she was temporarily
visiting her sister, and did not give up her New York domicile.
We need not, however, attempt to fill gaps in the record by speculation. We may discuss the case first on the assumption that Dorothy
was at all relevant times a resident of New York, and then consider
the interesting problem that is presented by the possibility that she
was a resident of another state at the time the contract was made.
On the assumption first stated, surely New York might reasonably
assert an interest in the application of its policy. It is New York
that is concerned with the welfare of the child; New York is the
community that would be affected should the child become a public
charge. This is not to say that New York must, or necessarily
would, construe its statute (or define its interest) thus broadly.
It might reasonably take into account the interest of Illinois in
232 11 App. Div. 2d at 435-36, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 629-31.
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protecting the father, and perhaps some of the other circumstances
of the case, and conclude that it should not create a conflict by
asserting a conflicting interest. 3 3 Perhaps the Haag case can be interpreted as just this sort of determination, though I cannot easily
accept that view when the discussion does not relate at all to the
scope of New York's legitimate interest in applying the policy of its
law, nor to the proper construction of the statute. I am inclined
to suspect that, in a matter of such clear concern to New York, if the
discussion had been explicitly in terms of whether New York should
assert an interest in the application of its law for the protection of
New York residents, no such extremely deferential result would have
been likely.
It will be noted that in this analysis we have mentioned only
those relationships between the parties, the transaction, and the
litigation that appear to be relevant to the policies of the respective
statutes. Possibly some that are relevant have been omitted; let us
review Judge Fuld's enumeration:
(1) The intention of the parties, including the specific agreement that the contract should be governed by Illinois law, should be
quite irrelevant. Presumably in a domestic case a mother would not
be allowed to sell her child's statutory birthright by agreeing to be
bound by the law of Illinois. No more should she be allowed to
do so in a mixed case. New York's concern for the welfare of the
child and the community cannot intelligently be committed to the
discretion and bargaining power of the mother.
(2) The place where the contract was "drawn and signed by
the complainant" should also be irrelevant. (I do not mean to
make an issue of the fact that Dorothy swore, and the defendant did
not deny, that he executed the contract in New York.) 34 Because
such arbitrary circumstances are familiar as critical "contacts" in
choice-of-law rules, there may seem to be, superficially, some relevance. But can anyone imagine that a New York court, setting
out to construe the New York Domestic Relations Law, rather than
to determine "what law governs," would hold that the statute was
intended to apply only to contracts made in New York, and that the
legislative purpose could be effectuated by such a construction?
(3) The fact that the defendant was a resident of Illinois is
1 3 Cf.

Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).
1'207 N.Y.S.2d at 630 (dissenting opinion).
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relevant as establishing an interest on the part of Illinois in the
application of its father-protective policy.185 The fact that his place
of business was in Illinois seems irrelevant. A statute relating to
some subject other than paternity might conceivably be held to be
for the benefit and protection of local businessmen, regardless of
their residence; it is even remotely conceivable that this very statute
could be so construed, though that seems beyond the pale of the
practical. It is easier to conceive of a holding that the statute
is for the benefit of all businessmen, wherever they live or ply their
trades, who become involved in Illinois; that would at least make
sense in terms of Chicago's status as a convention city.
(4) The fact that the child was born in Illinois is fortuitous and
obviously irrelevant to either of the policies involved, the mother
130
and custodian being a resident of New York.
(5) The fact that the persons named in the contract to act as
agents for the parties were residents of Illinois seems irrelevant,
though this can hardly be declared with confidence since -we are not
told what functions these agents were to perform. Without burdening this discussion with speculation on the point, I must say simply
that I cannot imagine any function to be performed by agents, or
arbiters, under such a contract that would bear significantly on the
effectuation of the respective governmental policies. The fact that
the lawyers who drew the contract were residents of Illinois is
irrelevant unless we can conceive that a New York court would
hold that the statute applies only to contracts drawn by New York
lawyers, because only New York lawyers can be supposed to know
New York law. I do not believe that Judge Fuld would so hold if
he were construing the statute; I believe he considered the fact
relevant only because he was engaged in the mystical process of determining "what law governs."
(6) The fact that all contributions for support were made from
Chicago is utterly irrelevant, and no one who has not been corrupted
.by the traditional system's preoccupation with "place of perform23r I leave out of account Judge Fuld's reference to the recital in the contract that
both parties were "of Illinois" (quotation supra note 130) since it conflicts with the
assumption that Dorothy was at all relevant times a resident of New York. Moreover,
the doubts expressed -about her- residence were -bascd on the possibility that she was
then a resident of Caifornia; there is no serious suggestion that she was ever a resident
of Illinois.
36Cf. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
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ance" would consider for a moment-that anything should turn on
whether Mr. Barnes mailed his weekly and monthly checks from
Chicago or had his attorney deliver cash in person in New York.
As for New York, it is relevant, as Judge Fuld notes, that Dorothy
was a resident; but the fact that "part of the 'liaison' took place
there" is relevant only if we assume a rather unlikely construction of
the New York statute.
One is tempted to go farther, and point out that some of the
"contacts" mentioned in the opinion are not taken into account in
the calculus (such as the fact that the contract of employment was
made in New York, through a New York employment agency), and
even to speculate on the weight to be given "contacts" not mentioned
in the opinion. But it is not necessary to be facetious in order to
emphasize that signficance has been attributed to circumstances
irrelevant to the definition of New York's interest in applying its
policy. In fairness to Judge Fuld, it must be said that he did not
claim that these circumstances were relevant in construing the New
York statute, but only in the process of determining "what law
governs." But the gist of my criticism is that he should have been
concerned with construing the New York statute instead.
We have established, I think, that only two relationships between the respective states and the parties, the events, and the litigation need be taken into account in order to formulate a definition
of governmental interests that each state might reasonably make.
It does not follow, of course, that no other facts or relationships can
be relevant in the court's actual definition of those interests. A
court inclined to define local interests with moderation and restraint
might with justification take other circumstances into account. For
example, it would not be unreasonable to distinguish between the
Haag case and one in which the New York mother-to-be travels to
Illinois and there seduces the man. Possibilities need not be multiplied. The point is that in defining the scope of New York's interest
in the parties and the events the circumstances given weight must
derive their significance from limitations that can reasonably be
placed on the reach of New York's policy.
It is evident that when the irrelevant contacts are brushed aside
there remains no scope for weighing, measuring, counting, and otherwise determining the "center of gravity." It is no longer reasonable,
if it ever was, to say that "the New York contacts are of far less
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weight and significance." The father is a resident of Illinois, and
Illinois has an interest in applying its policy for his protection.
The mother is a resident of New York, and is custodian of the

child, and New York has an interest in applying its law for the
welfare of the child and the community. These interests can be
weighed in the scales of individual opinion, or congressional opinion,

but not in any scales furnished to judges by the science of conflict
of laws. I do not presume to say that the court should have asserted

for New York an interest in the application of its law in the Haag
case. I say only that it should have addressed itself to the question
whether in the circumstances the New York statute should have been
construed to be applicable for the necessary effectuation of New
York policy, and that, if it had reached an affirmative answer to this
question, it should have applied New York law.
Given the fact that the settlement agreement was adequate by
New York standards, all this may seem beside the point; but this
is a dangerous refuge. The opinion spells out a method of solving
not only future problems of child support but problems of contract
generally in the conflict of laws and, not improbably, noncontract
problems as well. I am not at all sure that the refuge of "local public
policy," reserved by the court in concluding its opinion, is an
adequate device for dealing with future cases in which the Illinois
father provides not $275 a month but a lump-sum settlement of, say,
$900, or $1,000, or $3,000. Even as one is reassured by Judge Fuld's
indication that New York policy will come into play whenever the
provision for the child is inadequate by New York standards, one
recalls with apprehension the condemnation that has been heaped
upon courts for thus avoiding the "applicable" law. In addition,
there is special ground for concern: so long as New York persists in
designating the law of a sister state such as Illinois as the applicable
iaw, and relying on a second-line defense of "local public policy"
to protect its interests, it runs grave risk that its decision will be
held unconstitutional, as in Pearson. In a case parallel to Haag
except that the provision f6r the child is grossly inadequate, New

York could protect its interests only by striking down a defense
uznder the "applicable" law. The logic of the Brandeis position cannot be avoided so long as it is conceded that the foreign law is

exclusively applicable, on whatever theory; the fallacy of the position
is exposed only by recognition that the foreign law is not exclusively
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applicable in the first place, but that New York law is applicable
because of New York's interest in the effectuation of its policy.
We have now to consider briefly the problem presented on the
assumption that at the time of the settleinent agreement Dorothy was
not a resident of New York, but returned to New York before
bringing the support proceeding. For simplicity, and to state the
strongest case for the application of Illinois law, let us assume that at
the time of contracting she was a resident of Illinois. On this assumption, at the time of contracting Illinois was the only state having any
interest in the matter; the contract would be a valid release by the
law of the only interested state. At first sight, therefore, it would
appear anomalous to suggest that by moving to New York Dorothy
could acquire for the child greater support rights. Yet New York's
concern for the welfare of the child, and for the community, is no less
than it was on the assumption that Dorothy was a New Yorker at
the time of contracting. It is by no means unreasonable to suggest
that New York has a very real interest in the application of its law
in these circumstances, and that the interest of Illinois in immunizing the father from liability for support is not entitled to
prevail over the interests of other states that may later become
affected. In Yarborough v. Yarborough1 37 a Georgia court had pur-

ported, in a divorce proceeding, to absolve a father from all further
responsibility for the support of a minor child upon his paying the
sum of $1,750 to a trustee for that purpose. Later, residing with her
grandparents in South Carolina, the child sought additional support.
The Supreme Court held that full faith and credit to the Georgia
judgment precluded South Carolina from imposing further duties on
the father. Mr. Justice Stone wrote a powerful dissenting opinion,
concurred in by Mr. Justice Cardozo. The decision may have been
required-I am inclined to think it was-by the act of Congress
specifically directing that judgments "shall have the same.., faith
and credit in every court within the United States ...

as they have

by law or usage in the courts of such State... from which they are
taken."'138 No such congressional implementation of the clause applies to the laws of the several states, as distinguished from judgments,
1

90 U.S. 202 (1933).

128 28 U.S.C. § 1742. The quotation is from the 1948 revision, which was of course

not in force at the time; but the statute was not materially altered by the revision,
despite the insertion of the word "Acts."
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however; and Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinion provides ample
basis for a firm belief that the Supreme Court would not hold New
York precluded by a mere contract made in Illinois from asserting
its interest in the case supposed. No quotation brief enough to be
appropriate here could do justice to the opinion; it should be
read in its entirety by anyone who doubts the constitutionality of
such an application of New York law.
The fact remains that one must regard with some concern the
phenomenon that the settled rights of ihe parties, under a contract
lawful by reference to the laws of the only state having an interest at
the time, can be unsettled by the unilateral act of the one party in
moving her residence to another state. In previous discussions of
this general problem, I have suggested that, normally, a "governmental interest," as the term is used in conflict-of-laws analysis, must
be the product of (1) a governmental policy, and (2) a concurrent
relationship with the parties, the events, or the litigation such as to
provide a reasonable basis for application of the policy. I have
further suggested that a state's application of its policy to a contract
in which it had no interest at the time of contracting raises a problem
analogous to that of the retroactive application of legislation in a
domestic case. 13 9 In the version of the Haag case under discussion,
when the contract was made in 1956, New York had its policy relating to support of illegitimate children but no interest in applying
that policy to Haag and Barnes; when such a statute is retroactively
applied to a wholly domestic case, while it may be said loosely that
the state at all times had an "interest" in the matter, it had, at the
time of contracting, no such policy.

To say that application of New York law in such a situation is
comparable to the retroactive application of legislation is not to
condemn it. Much retroactive legislation is both desirable and constitutional. The test is essentially one of reasonableness in the light
of all the circumstances; the exigency of the public need is to be
balanced against the unsettling of private expectations. "[I]n very
general terms the two major factors to be weighed in determining
the validity of a retroactive statute are the strength of the public in21 The suggestion is only that there is an analogy. It is, of course, true that the
New York Domestic Relations Law, enacted in 1925, is not given literally retroactive
effect if applied to a contract made in 1956; but if the contract is one made in Illinois
in the circumstances under discussion, the effect is much the same.
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terest it serves and the unfairness created by its retroactive operation.... -140

The interest of a state in securing adequate support

of children within its borders is a vital one; the fathers of such children can complain with little grace that they relied on a state of the
law, or on a contract, absolving them of responsibility. There can
be little doubt that New York could constitutionally make its
Domestic Relaions Law of 1925 applicable to domestic settlements
concluded prior to its enactment. If so, for similar reasons it may
apply that law to a contract made in Illinois at a time when New
York had no interest in the matter. "[I]t would not seem open
to serious question that every state has an interest in securing the
maintenance and support of minor children residing within its
territory so complete and so vital to the performance of its functions
as a government, that no other state could set limits upon it."'1'
It happens, however, that New York has not chosen to apply its
Domestic.Relations Law to supersede support agreements made prior
to its passage. 42 Thus New York has not declared that its policy
of requiring paternal support for illegitimate children is so exigent
as to require the disturbance of rights previously settled by domestic
contract. In previous discussions of the general problem, I have
taken the position that the absence of such a declaration should be
decisive of the question whether the statute should be applied to
the out-of-state contract. Under the stimulus of constructive critin 43
cism
I have reconsidered this position, and agree that it needs
modification. It was based upon the feeling that a state cannot
consisterntly say that no such exigency exists as to require abrogation
of pre-existing contracts, and at the same time assert that urgent policy considerations require abrogation of foreign contracts. This was
210 Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislav.692, 727 (1960). See also Slawson, Constitutionaland Legislative
Considerationsin RetroactiveLawmaking, 48 CALm. L. REv. 216 (1960) ("[Q]uestions of
retroactive law are essentially questions of substantive due process, and ... any attempt
to treat retroactivity as a special category to which special rules are to be applied is
wasted effort." Id. at 216); Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57
-ARV. L. Rv. 512, 621, 852 (1944); Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5
TmxAs L. REV.281 (1927), 6 TExAs L. Rav. 409 (1928).
"I Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 225 (1938).
Cf. Ford v. Ford, 371 US. 187 (1962), which, in conjunction with May v. Anderson,
845 U.S. 528 (1953), seems to suggest that for purposes of full faith and credit there
may be no such thing as a judgment finally determining the custody of a minor child.
112Ippolito v. Terragni, 140 Misc. 606, 251 N.Y.S. 376 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
' E.g., M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie'sRestrained and Enlightened
Forum, 49 CAlls. L. Rrv. 845, 867-69 (1961).

tion, 73 Hmtv. L. R
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carrying the analogy too far. There is at least this difference between
the prior domestic contract and the out-of-state contract: time will
cure the obstacle to state policy presented by the prior domestic
contract; it can never cure the obstacle presented by the out-of-state
contract. Eventually all pre-1925 contracts exonerating New York
fathers will fade out of the picture; but unwed mothers from Illinois
or Georgia may continue to move to New York with their offspring
until the end of time. New York might reasonably, therefore, determine that, while there is no such urgent necessity as would require
supersession of prior domestic contracts, out-of-state contracts must
be superseded. 144
I conclude that, even if the mother was a resident of Illinois at
the time of the settlement agreement, in a case like Haag involving
inadequate provision for the child, New York has a legitimate interest in applying its own law to require support by the father-if
New York will only assert its interest.
CONCLUSION

Of the four decisions that have been considered here, the most indefensible is Babcock v.Jackson, which sacrificed New York's interests on the altar of territorialism without advancing the interest
of any state. That was a decision, however, by an intermediate
appellate court, and one may hope that it will not have enduring
value as a precedent. Since there was no real conflict in Haag v.
Barnes, no immediate harm was done; but the pattern of reasoning
laid down for use in future cases forebodes many a real sacrifice of
New York interests to those of a foreign state. This, however, is a
matter of local rather than national concern, except as a matter of
conflict-of-laws theory; if New York is content to subordinate its
interests to the competing interests of another state, the rest of us
need not protest too much, so long as our own courts are not tempted
to follow the precedent. In Kilberg the New York court put aside
territorialist dogma and, unimpeded by the confusion of "most sigI'l These considerations, of course, have altered my view as to the proper disposition
of Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 263 U.S. 207 (1960). See Currie, The Verdict of
Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Car. L. REV. 258, 290-94
(1961). Watson v. Employers Liab. Ins. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), is not decisive of
the question, for the legislation there involved was retroactively applied. Cf. Rossville
Comm'l Alchhol Corp. v. Denins Sheen Transfer Co.,- 18 La. App. 725, 138 So. 182
(1931); Bouis v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 91 F. Supp. 954 (W.D. La. 1950).
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nificant contacts," justifiably asserted New York's interest in opposition to the conflicting interest of Massachusetts. By far the most
important of the cases is Pearson,in which this enlightened decision
is stigmatized as unconstitutional. As this is written, Pearsonis under reconsideration by the full bench of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. Perhaps by the time this is published the judgment will have been reversed. It must be reversed, if not by the
court of appeals, by the Supreme Court. The tragic alternative is
that progress toward a rational method of handling conflict-of-laws
problems will be paralyzed when it has hardly begun.
EPMOGUE

The foregoing discussion had just been completed when the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit announced its decision
superseding that of the panel in Pearson and affirming the judgment
of the district court.' 45 By a vote of six to three the court adopted
the dissenting opinion written by Judge Kaufman as a member of the
panel, and Judge Kaufman amplified the views of the majority on
the narrow issue dividing the active members of the court. Judge
Friendly wrote a dissenting opinion in which Judges Lumbard and
Moore joined714
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this highly significant decision is the agreement of all nine of the active judges of the circuit
that New York could constitutionally apply its own wrongful death
statute in the circumstances. At best Judge Swan's opinion for the
panel had been ambiguous on this point; at worst, in Judge Kaufman's terms, it froze "into constitutional mandate a choice-of-law
rule derived from what may be described as the Ice Age of conflict
of laws jurisprudence-at a time when that jurisprudence is in an
advanced stage of thaw."' 47 The dissenting opinion's explicit concession on the point means that the court is unanimous in its refusal
to write into the Constitution an enforced universal deference to
the law of the place of injury.
We have seen that the New York court's rationale for the Kilberg
decision was highly vulnerable to traditional criticism in both its
branches. The dissent seizes upon both weaknesses. This means
2,r Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962) (rehearing in banc),
rever.sing 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962). cert. denied, 31 U.S.L. NVEan (3259 U.S. Feb. 18,
1963).
2 6d. at 564.

14 71d. at 557.
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that in good part it is concerned with flogging a dead horse, since
the New York court had withdrawn its untenable procedural characterization. Apart from that, however, the judges of the minority,
though accepting the authority of such Supreme Court decisions
as Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,148 were unable
to see any justification for "New York's invoking the Massachusetts
Act as the source of the right and then transforming the right into
one altogether different in nature and amount from what Massachu-

setts has decreed."''14 This is in substance, though not in terms so
explicit as Judge Swan's, adherence to the Brandeis position.
Just as that position is difficult to attack when the underlying
assumptions concede some inherent "applicability" to the law of the
place of injury, so it is difficult to maintain when those assumptions
are abandoned and New York is conceded freedom to apply its own
wrongful death statute in its entirety. The objection then becomes
largely conceptual; for how can the result in Kilberg be unconstitutional when the same result would be unobjectionable if rationalized
on other grounds? Judge Friendly recognizes this difficulty. Briefly
and parenthetically he suggests that conceptualism may be valuable
for its own sake in a federal system-a point he apparently would not
enjoy elaborating.150 But "practical" considerations are adduced as
well. The process of giving new dimensions to the cause of action
created by the Massachusetts statute "interferes with the proper freedom of action of the legislature of the sister state."'' 1 If New York
may tamper with the cause of action, Massachusetts may not wish to
bring it into being. As a practical consideration this has a hollow
ring; lawmakers notoriously legislate with the domestic scene in
mind, leaving it to the courts to puzzle out the application of local
law to cases with foreign elements. But the essential fault of the
reasoning is that it loses sight of the fact that New York is applying
New York's own wrongful death statute, though not all of it.152 The
its0 348

U.S. 66 (1954).

209 F.2d at 569.
811

1 T]he two processes differ.., conceptually-which may not be altogether unimportant in a legal system designed to maintain a certain degree of order among fifty
states..
Id. at 565.
S5Ibid.
152 "True, New York reiterated its partial adherence to the rule of lex loci delicus.
But does this require that New York be deprived of any power to apply a fundamental
rule of public policy to one incident of the cause of action? New York has done
nothing more than to apply a traditional choice-of-law rule which designates the law
of Massachusetts as the source of liability for a wrongful death. It has absorbed the
Massachusetts rule into the corpus of New York law for purposes of adjudicating this
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argument assumes that there would be no recovery in Kilberg if
there were no wrongful death statute in Massachusetts. But that is
inconceivable; if New York policy forbids any limitation on the
amount recoverable, it certainly forbids limitation of recovery to
zero. Judge Friendly's dissent should at least persuade the New
York Court of Appeals that dangerous pitfalls are created by its
technique of paying lip-service to traditional doctrine.
Judge Kaufman met the issue tendered by the dissent squarely
and effectively. He did so, inessence, by standing firm on the ground
taken by Mr. Justice Stone in Alaska Packers53 in 1935, an emi.nence from which the Supreme Court has since retreated only
once:'i the Constitution does not require a state having a legitimate
interest in the application of its law and policy to yield to the conflicting interest of another state; and this is true whether the forum
state's policy is asserted as a defense or as a ground for affirmative
relief.
The decision is a major victory for those who, at least since
Walter Wheeler Cook, have struggled on the bench, at the bar, and
through academic media against the shackles of traditional dogma.
No doubt there will be bickering over the extent to which the
decision gives aid and comfort to the -respective modem efforts to
formulate a better method, 55 but that seems relatively unimportant
at this moment. The important thing is that we have all been left
free to work toward a better law of conflict of laws.
case fairly.... We believe that in doing so New York is not bound to model all of
the rules governing this litigation in which it is conceded it has a legitimate interest,
on Massachusetts law...." Kaufman, J., Id. at 560-61.
'~

't

1

See quotation in text supra note 79.

Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
Cf. Ei-RNZAVEIO, CONFucr OF LAWs 475

(1952),

commenting on Bernkrant v.

Foider, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906 (1961).

